
NERC Coal 400-599


SWEPCO SOLID FUEL UNITS

COAL UNITS 400-599 MW




2018


40



SWEPCO SOLID FUEL UNITS

COAL UNITS 600-799 MW





SWEPCO SOLID FUEL UNITS

LIGNITE UNITS

Figure 5





Figure 6



COMBINED CYCLE UNITS

Figure 1







Figure 2





COMBUSTION TURBINE UNITS 50+ MW







NATURAL GAS 100-199 MW





NATURAL GAS 300-399 MW





EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF DYLAN W. D'ASCENDIS

Mr. D'Ascendis' Direct Testimony establishes that a Return on Equity (referred to as the "ROE" or the "Cost of Equity") rate in the range of 10.32% to 11.43% is necessary for Southwestern Electric Power Company ("SWEPCO" or the "Company") to provide a reasonable return to its equity investors. His recommended range considers a variety of factors that affect the required return to equity investors including:

- The multiple analytical approaches that were evaluated to develop his recommended range; and
- How the Cost of Equity is affected by the Company's relative small size and its lower credit rating.

Mr. D'Ascendis' Direct Testimony presents multiple analytical techniques for the purposes of estimating the Company's ROE. To develop his recommendation, he estimated the ROE using the Constant Growth Discounted Cash Flow ("DCF") model, the Risk Premium Model ("RPM"), and the Capital Asset Pricing Model ("CAPM"), and applied those methodologies to a proxy group of electric utilities ("Utility Proxy Group"), as well as to a proxy group of non-price regulated companies similar in total risk to the Utility Proxy Group ("Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group").

Together with the Schedules attached to Mr. D'Ascendis' Direct Testimony, this evidence demonstrates that a Cost of Equity rate in the range of 10.32% to 11.43% is reasonable, and should be adopted for SWEPCO in order to provide the Company with an opportunity to generate earnings that maintain a reasonable return to its equity investors.

PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION OF TEXAS

APPLICATION OF SOUTHWESTERN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY FOR AUTHORITY TO CHANGE RATES

DIRECT TESTIMONY OF DYLAN W. D'ASCENDIS

FOR

SOUTHWESTERN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY

OCTOBER 2020

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| [. | | AND PURPOSE | |
|-------------|------------|---|---------|
| II. | | | |
| III. | | ET CONDITIONS | |
| IV. | | CIPLES | |
| | | | |
| V. | | HE UTILITY PROXY GROUP | |
| v. VI. | | TURE | |
| vi. VII. | | TY COST RATE MODELS | |
| V 11. | | ish Flow Model | |
| | | nium Model | |
| | | sset Pricing Model | |
| | | ity Cost Rates for a Proxy Group of Domestic, Non- | |
| | | ed Companies Based on the DCF, RPM, and CAPM | 48 |
| VIII. | | F COMMON EQUITY COST RATE BEFORE | |
| | | | |
| IX. | | TO THE COMMON EQUITY COST RATE | |
| | | nt | |
| | | djustment | |
| X. | | S | |
| Λ. | CONCLUSION | | 3 / |
| | | LIST OF SCHEDULES | |
| Sched | ule DWD-1: | Summary of Overall Cost of Capital and Return on E | Equity |
| Sched | ule DWD-2: | Financial Profile of Southwestern Electric Power Co | mpany |
| | | and the Utility Proxy Group | |
| Sched | ule DWD-3: | Application of the Discounted Cash Flow Model | |
| Sched | ule DWD-4: | Application of the Risk Premium Model | |
| Sched | ule DWD-5: | Application of the Capital Asset Pricing Model | |
| Sched | ule DWD-6: | Basis of Selection for the Non-Price Regulated Com | panies |
| | | Comparable in Total Risk to the Utility Proxy Group |) |
| Sched | ule DWD-7: | Application of Cost of Common Equity Models to the | ie Non- |
| | | Price Regulated Proxy Group | |
| Sched | ule DWD-8: | Derivation of the Indicated Size Premium for Southv | vestern |
| | | Electric Power Company Relative to the Utility Prox | y |
| | | Group | |
| | | | |

| I | INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE |
|---|--------------------------|
| | |

| 2 | Q. | PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME, AFFILIATION, AND BUSINESS ADDRESS. |
|----|----|--|
| 3 | A. | My name is Dylan W. D'Ascendis. I am employed by ScottMadden, Inc. as |
| 4 | | Director. My business address is 3000 Atrium Way, Suite 241, Mount Laurel, NJ |
| 5 | | 08054. |
| 6 | Q. | ON WHOSE BEHALF ARE YOU SUBMITTING THIS TESTIMONY? |
| 7 | A. | I am submitting this direct testimony (referred to throughout as my "Direct |
| 8 | | Testimony") before the Public Utility Commission of Texas ("Commission") on |
| 9 | | behalf of Southwestern Electric Power Company ("SWEPCO" or the "Company"). |
| 10 | Q. | PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE AND |
| 11 | | EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND. |
| 12 | A. | I have offered expert testimony on behalf of investor-owned utilities in over 20 state |
| 13 | | regulatory commissions in the United States, the Federal Energy Regulatory |
| 14 | | Commission, the Alberta Utility Commission, and one American Arbitration |
| 15 | | Association panel on issues including, but not limited to, common equity cost rate, |
| 16 | | rate of return, valuation, capital structure, class cost of service, and rate design. |
| 17 | | On behalf of the American Gas Association ("AGA"), I calculate the AGA |
| 18 | | Gas Index, which serves as the benchmark against which the performance of the |
| 19 | | American Gas Index Fund ("AGIF") is measured on a monthly basis. The AGA Gas |
| 20 | | Index and AGIF are a market capitalization weighted index and mutual fund, |
| 21 | | respectively, comprised of the common stocks of the publicly traded corporate |
| 22 | | members of the AGA. |

| 1 | | I am a member of the Society of Utility and Regulatory Financial Analysts |
|----|----|---|
| 2 | | ("SURFA"). In 2011, I was awarded the professional designation "Certified Rate of |
| 3 | | Return Analyst" by SURFA, which is based on education, experience, and the |
| 4 | | successful completion of a comprehensive written examination. |
| 5 | | I am also a member of the National Association of Certified Valuation |
| 6 | | Analysts ("NACVA") and was awarded the professional designation "Certified |
| 7 | | Valuation Analyst" by the NACVA in 2015. |
| 8 | | I am a graduate of the University of Pennsylvania, where I received a |
| 9 | | Bachelor of Arts degree in Economic History. I have also received a Master of |
| 10 | | Business Administration with high honors and concentrations in Finance and |
| 11 | | International Business from Rutgers University. |
| 12 | | The details of my educational background and expert witness appearances are |
| 13 | | shown in Appendix A. |
| 14 | Q. | WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR DIRECT TESTIMONY? |
| 15 | A. | The purpose of my testimony is to present evidence on behalf of SWEPCO and |
| 16 | | recommend an ROE for its Texas jurisdictional rate base, and to assess the |
| 17 | | Company's actual capital structure ratios. |
| 18 | Q. | HAVE YOU PREPARED SCHEDULES IN SUPPORT OF YOUR |
| 19 | | RECOMMENDATION? |
| 20 | A. | Yes. I have prepared Schedules DWD-1 through DWD-8, which were prepared by |
| 21 | | me or under my direction. |
| 22 | | |

II. SUMMARY

2 O. WHAT IS YOUR RECOMMENDED ROE FOR SWEPCO?

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A. I recommend that the Commission authorize SWEPCO the opportunity to earn an ROE of 10.35% on its jurisdictional rate base within a reasonable range of 10.32% to 11.43%. The ratemaking capital structure and cost of long-term debt is sponsored by Company Witness Hawkins. The overall rate of return is summarized on page 1 of Schedule DWD-1 and in Table 1 below:

Table 1: Summary of Recommended Weighted Average Cost of Capital

| Type of Capital | Ratios | Cost Rate | Weighted Cost Rate |
|-----------------|---------------|-----------|--------------------|
| Long-Term Debt | 50.63% | 4.18% | 2.11% |
| Common Equity | <u>49.37%</u> | 10.35% | <u>5.11%</u> |
| Total | 100.00% | | <u>7.22%</u> |

9 Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR RECOMMENDED ROE.

A. My recommended ROE of 10.35% is summarized on page 2 of Schedule DWD-1. I have assessed the market-based common equity cost rates of companies of relatively similar, but not necessarily identical, risk to SWEPCO. Using companies of relatively comparable risk as proxies is consistent with the principles of fair rate of return established in the *Hope¹* and *Bluefield²* decisions. No proxy group can be identical in risk to any single company. Consequently, there must be an evaluation of relative risk between the company and the proxy group to determine if it is appropriate to adjust the proxy group's indicated rate of return.

Federal Power Comm'n v Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944) ("Hope").

² Bluefield Water Works Improvement Co. v Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 679 (1922) ("Bluefield").

My recommendation results from applying several cost of common equity models, specifically the DCF model, the RPM, and the CAPM, to the market data of the Utility Proxy Group whose selection criteria will be discussed below. In addition, I applied the DCF model, RPM, and CAPM to the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group. The results derived from each are as follows:

Table 2: Summary of Common Equity Cost Rates

| | T |
|---|------------------------|
| Discounted Cash Flow Model | 8.73% |
| Risk Premium Model | 10.54% |
| Capital Asset Pricing Model | 12.46% |
| Cost of Equity Models Applied to Comparable Risk, Non-Price Regulated Companies | 12.12% |
| Indicated Range of Common Equity Cost Rates Before Adjustments | 9.85% - 10.96% |
| Size Adjustment | 0.20% |
| Credit Risk Adjustment | 0.27% |
| Indicated Range of Common Equity Cost Rates after Adjustment | <u>10.32% - 11.43%</u> |
| Recommended Cost of Common Equity | 10.35% |

The indicated range of common equity cost rates applicable to the Utility Proxy Group is between 9.85% and 10.96% before any Company-specific adjustments. The 9.85% low end of the range is calculated by taking the average model result (10.96%), and averaging that with the lowest model result (8.73%). The 10.96% high end of the range is the average of all model results.

I then adjusted the indicated common equity cost rate upward by 0.20% and 0.27% to reflect the Company's smaller relative size and riskier bond rating, as compared to the Utility Proxy Group. These adjustments resulted in a Company-specific indicated range of common equity cost rates between 10.32% and 11.43%.

| 1 | | Given the Utility Proxy Group and Company-specific ranges of common equity cost |
|--|----|--|
| 2 | | rates, my recommended ROE for SWEPCO is 10.35%. |
| 3 | Q. | WHY DID YOU USE THE MIDPOINT BETWEEN YOUR AVERAGE MODEL |
| 4 | | RESULT AND YOUR LOWEST MODEL RESULT AS THE BOTTOM OF YOUR |
| 5 | | INDICATED REASONABLE RANGE BEFORE ADJUSTMENT? |
| 6 | A. | As will be explained in detail below, the turmoil in markets attributable to the |
| 7 | | COVID-19 pandemic has increased risk for the entire economy generally, and |
| 8 | | utilities, specifically. Key takeaways include: |
| 9 | | • The full impact and duration of the COVID-19 pandemic are unknown, and outcomes are highly uncertain; |
| 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | | • This uncertainty increases volatility. Volatility increases the chances of investment losses. As a result, investors flee to bonds to limit their investment losses, which is known as "the flight to safety". Increased levels of bond purchases increase their price, and drive down their yields, <i>i.e.</i> , interest rates. Because of this, the current low-interest rate environment is due to increased volatility in the market, and not a steady lowering of the cost of debt over time; |
| 20 21 22 23 24 25 | | • The same increased market volatility that caused investors' "flight to safety" also created a situation where utilities are traded similar to the S&P 500. These correlated returns of utility stocks and market indices increase Beta coefficients (a measure of risk), and by extension, investor-required returns; and |
| 26 27 28 29 | | • Investor-influencing publications such as <i>Blue Chip Financial Forecasts</i> (" <i>Blue Chip</i> "), Standard & Poor's ("S&P"), and Moody's Investor Service ("Moody's") have recognized the risks of the COVID-19 pandemic, and have reflected them in their analyses. |
| 30 | | My recommendation to use the lower end of the range of my results for the |
| 31 | | bottom of my Utility Proxy Group reasonable range is designed to be conservative |
| 32 | | given that volatility and uncertainty. |

III. CAPITAL MARKET CONDITIONS

| 1 | Q. | PLEASE SUMMARIZE THE RECENT CAPITAL MARKET CONDITIONS. |
|----|----|--|
| 2 | A. | The recent, dramatic shifts in the capital markets brought about by COVID-19 cannot |
| 3 | | be overstated. Central banks have implemented multiple policies to address the |
| 4 | | financial market instability. The Federal Reserve reduced the overnight lending rate |
| 5 | | to a target range of 0.00% to 0.25%, announced plans to increase holdings of |
| 6 | | Treasury securities and agency mortgage-backed securities by a total of \$700 |
| 7 | | billion, ³ established a facility to facilitate lending to small businesses via the Small |
| 8 | | Business Administration's Paycheck Protection Program ("PPP") by providing term |
| 9 | | financing backed by PPP loans, ⁴ and took additional actions to provide up to \$2.3 |
| 10 | | trillion in loans to support the economy. ⁵ |
| 11 | | The U.S. Government also acted to attempt to address the unstable financial |
| 12 | | markets. The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, provided \$2.4 |
| 13 | | trillion in economic stimulus and the PPP and Health Care Enhancement Act |
| 14 | | provided an additional \$484 billion in emergency aid. ⁶ |
| 15 | | Despite government and central bank actions, the 30-Year Treasury bond |
| 16 | | yield has remained highly volatile, as seen in its coefficient of variation ⁷ (see Chart |
| 17 | | 1, below). |


Federal Reserve Press Release, March 15, 2020.


⁴ Federal Reserve Press Release, April 6, 2020.

⁵ Federal Reserve Press Release, April 9, 2020.

⁶ S&P Global Market Intelligence, *Trump signs \$484B coronavirus relief package into law*, April 24, 2020

⁷ The coefficient of variation is used by investors and economists to determine volatility.






Investor reactions to the market instability also are reflected in the "yield spread", or the difference between dividend yields and long-term Government bond yields. As the 30-year Treasury yield fell, utility dividend yields increased, widening the yield spread (*see* Chart 2, below). That pattern, in which utility dividend yields move in the opposite direction of interest rates, reflects the disjointed capital market, and investors' reactions to it. Under more "normal" conditions, dividend yields tend to be directionally related to Treasury yields, such that the yield spread remains relatively constant. But that relationship has a limit. Investors will not continuously bid up utility prices as interest rates fall; the widening yield spread demonstrates as much.

⁸ Source: Bloomberg Professional Service.

Chart 2: Utility Dividend Yields vs. 30-Year Treasury Yields9




Additionally, I assessed the correlation of the changes in prices in the XLU¹⁰ with the changes in prices of the S&P 500 to determine whether there was any relationship between the two during the current crisis. As shown in Chart 3 below, as the Coronavirus threat became apparent (*i.e.*, mid-February 2020), the correlation between the price changes of the XLU and the price changes of the S&P 500 increased from near 0.20 to near 0.70 (using a two-year correlation, consistent with Bloomberg Beta calculations) and from 0.25 to nearly 0.60 (using a five-year correlation, consistent with *Value Line Investment Survey's* ("*Value Line*") Beta calculations).

⁹ Source: S&P Capital IQ.

The Utilities Select Sector SPDR® Fund, which serves as a proxy for publicly traded electric utility stocks.

Chart 3: Correlation Between Price Movements of the XLU and S&P 500 Since January 2020¹¹



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This increase in correlation between price changes for the XLU and those for the S&P 500 is not surprising. As Morningstar recently explained, during volatile markets there often is little distinction in risk across assets or portfolios. That is, "correlations go to 1." When that happens, utility stocks lose their "defensive" quality.

- Q. ARE YOU AWARE OF ANY INVESTOR-INFLUENCING PUBLICATIONS
 THAT INDICATED THE COST OF CAPITAL HAS INCREASED DURING THE
 RECENT MARKET DISLOCATION?
- 12 A. Yes. The April 10, 2020 edition of *Blue Chip Economic Indicators* ("*BCEI*")

 13 described the pandemic's effect on the general economy as follows:

¹¹ Source: S&P Capital IQ.

¹² Morningstar, Correlations Going to 1 Amid Market Collapse, U.S. Stock Fund Factors Show Little Differentiation, March 6, 2020.

| This month's <i>Blue Chip Economic Indicators</i> panel's forecast for real |
|---|
| GDP in Q2 2020 is estimated to set a historical record - by far: a |
| plunge of -24.5% SAAR [Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate]. The |
| previous record was -10.0% in Q1 1958; quarterly data began in Q1 |
| 1947. In its February forecast, the panel had projected Q2 growth to |
| be 1.9% SAAR and in March 1.0%. 13 |

BCEI further explained that it expects the "easing of the current outbreak of the disease and accompanying social distancing practices will support a visible recovery in the second half of this year and on into 2021." At the same time, BCEI cautioned that "the speed of the recovery would be nowhere near the magnitude of the drop," and according to its consensus forecast, "real GDP would not recover to its previous peak until the fourth quarter of 2021." ¹⁴

It is within that broad context that S&P downgraded its outlook on the utility sector from "Stable" to "Negative", explaining that it expects a 12.00% contraction in GDP during the second quarter of 2020, reducing commercial and industrial usage. 15

Although utilities have some discretion as to how they may reduce capital investments while maintaining safe and reliable service, in a prolonged recession they may consider reducing dividend payments. As S&P notes, "[t]here is precedent that during times of high financial stress, utilities have reduced their dividends and we would expect that the industry, if necessary, would use this lever, acting prudently to preserve credit quality." It is through such "levers" that S&P expects the sector to remain a high quality, investment grade industry. 17

Blue Chip Economic Indicators, April 10, 2020, at 1. [clarification added]

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ S&P Global Ratings, COVID-19: The Outlook For North American Regulated Utilities Turns Negative, April 2, 2020, at 1, 6-7.

Ibid., at 9.

¹⁷ Ibid.

| Moody's similarly observed that "[i]n a prolonged economic downturn |
|--|
| boards of directors are likely to review dividend plans as an option to conserve |
| cash."18 Moody's expects companies with higher payout ratios as more likely to |
| reduce dividends, and sees the potential for average dividend payout ratios to |
| increase to about 80.00% from a median of 63.00% in 2019. ¹⁹ In Moody's view, the |
| ability to reduce dividends provides utilities "with a significant source of interna |
| cash that could help them offset the impact of a potentially prolonged coronavirus- |
| related economic downturn."20 |
| |

S&P and Moody's both point to reducing the growth in dividends as a means of preserving credit quality in the event of a prolonged economic downturn. Doing so, however, comes at the expense of equity investors. The potential tension between maintaining credit quality and preserving dividends is another reason the Cost of Equity may increase.

In short, during a period of heightened and possibly prolonged market uncertainty, observable market information makes clear that utility investors now face greater risks and require higher returns.

¹⁸ Moody's Investors Service, Dividends a major source of cash if coronavirus downturn is prolonged, April 6, 2020, at 1.

Ibid., at 2-3.

Ibid., at 1.

IV. GENERAL PRINCIPLES

| 2 | Q. | WHAT GENERAL PRINCIPLES HAVE YOU CONSIDERED IN ARRIVING AT |
|---|----|--|
| 3 | | YOUR RECOMMENDED COMMON EQUITY COST RATE OF 10.35%? |

- In unregulated industries, marketplace competition is the principal determinant of the price of products or services. For regulated public utilities, regulation must act as a substitute for marketplace competition. Assuring that the utility can fulfill its obligations to the public, while providing safe and reliable service at all times, requires a level of earnings sufficient to maintain the integrity of presently invested capital. Sufficient earnings also permit the attraction of needed new capital at a reasonable cost, for which the utility must compete with other firms of comparable risk, consistent with the fair rate of return standards established by the U.S. Supreme Court in the previously cited *Hope* and *Bluefield* cases. Consequently, marketplace data must be relied on in assessing a common equity cost rate appropriate for ratemaking purposes. Just as the use of market data for the Utility Proxy Group adds the reliability necessary to inform expert judgment in arriving at a recommended common equity cost rate, the use of multiple generally accepted common equity cost rate models also adds reliability and accuracy when arriving at a recommended common equity cost rate.
- A. Business Risk

A.

- Q. PLEASE DEFINE BUSINESS RISK AND EXPLAIN WHY IT IS IMPORTANT
 FOR DETERMINING A FAIR RATE OF RETURN.
- A. The investor-required return on common equity reflects investors' assessment of the total investment risk of the subject firm. Total investment risk is often discussed in

the context of business and financial risk.

Business risk reflects the uncertainty associated with owning a company's common stock without the company's use of debt and/or preferred stock financing. One way of considering the distinction between business and financial risk is to view the former as the uncertainty of the expected earned return on common equity, assuming the firm is financed with no debt.

Examples of business risks generally faced by utilities include, but are not limited to, the regulatory environment, mandatory environmental compliance requirements, customer mix and concentration of customers, service territory economic growth, market demand, risks and uncertainties of supply, operations, capital intensity, size, the degree of operating leverage, emerging technologies including distributed energy resources, the vagaries of weather, and the like, all of which have a direct bearing on earnings. Although analysts, including rating agencies, may categorize business risks individually, as a practical matter, such risks are interrelated and not wholly distinct from one another. Therefore, it is difficult to specifically and numerically quantify the effect of any individual risk on investors' required return, *i.e.*, the cost of capital. For determining an appropriate return on common equity, the relevant issue is where investors see the subject company as falling within a spectrum of risk. To the extent investors view a company as being exposed to higher risk, the required return will increase, and vice versa.

For regulated utilities, business risks are both long-term and near-term in nature. Whereas near-term business risks are reflected in year-to-year variability in earnings and cash flow brought about by economic or regulatory factors, long-term

business risks reflect the prospect of an impaired ability of investors to obtain both a fair rate of return on, and return of, their capital. Moreover, because utilities accept the obligation to provide safe, adequate, and reliable service at all times (in exchange for a reasonable opportunity to earn a fair return on their investment), they generally do not have the option to delay, defer, or reject capital investments. Because those investments are capital-intensive, utilities generally do not have the option to avoid raising external funds during periods of capital market distress, if necessary.

Because utilities invest in long-lived assets, long-term business risks are of paramount concern to equity investors. That is, the risk of not recovering the return on their investment extends far into the future. The timing and nature of events that may lead to losses, however, also are uncertain and, consequently, those risks and their implications for the required return on equity tend to be difficult to quantify. Regulatory commissions (like investors who commit their capital) must review a variety of quantitative and qualitative data and apply their reasoned judgment to determine how long-term risks weigh in their assessment of the market-required return on common equity.

B. Financial Risk

- 18 Q. PLEASE DEFINE FINANCIAL RISK AND EXPLAIN WHY IT IS IMPORTANT
 19 IN DETERMINING A FAIR RATE OF RETURN.
- A. Financial risk is the additional risk created by the introduction of debt and preferred stock into the capital structure. The higher the proportion of debt and preferred stock in the capital structure, the higher the financial risk to common equity owners (*i.e.*, failure to receive dividends due to default or other covenants). Therefore, consistent

| 1 | with the basic financial principle of risk and return, common equity investors require |
|---|--|
| 2 | higher returns as compensation for bearing higher financial risk. |

- 3 Q. CAN BOND AND CREDIT RATINGS BE A PROXY FOR A FIRM'S
- 4 COMBINED BUSINESS AND FINANCIAL RISKS TO EQUITY OWNERS (I.E.,
- 5 INVESTMENT RISK)?
- A. Yes, similar bond ratings/issuer credit ratings reflect, and are representative of, similar combined business and financial risks (*i.e.*, total risk) faced by bond investors. Although specific business or financial risks may differ between companies, the same bond/credit rating indicates that the combined risks are roughly similar from a debtholder perspective. The caveat is that these debtholder risk measures do not translate directly to risks for common equity.
- 12 Q. DO RATING AGENCIES ACCOUNT FOR COMPANY SIZE IN THEIR BOND13 RATINGS?
- A. No. Neither S&P nor Moody's have minimum company size requirements for any given rating level. This means, all else equal, a relative size analysis must be conducted for equity investments in companies with similar bond ratings.

Risk distinctions within S&P's bond rating categories are recognized by a plus or minus, e.g., within the A category, an S&P rating can be an A+, A, or A-. Similarly, risk distinction for Moody's ratings are distinguished by numerical rating gradations, e.g., within the A category, a Moody's rating can be A1, A2 and A3.

V. SWEPCO AND THE UTILITY PROXY GROUP

| | O. | ARE YOU I | AMILIAR | WITH S | SWEPCO'S | OPERATIONS |
|--|----|-----------|---------|--------|----------|-------------------|
|--|----|-----------|---------|--------|----------|-------------------|

A.

Yes. SWEPCO provides electric services to approximately 540,000 retail customers in Texas, Louisiana, and Arkansas.²² SWEPCO has long-term issuer ratings of Baa2 from Moody's and A- from S&P. SWEPCO is not publicly-traded as it comprises an operating subsidiary of American Electric Power Company, Inc. ("AEP" or the "Parent"), which has electric distribution operations in 11 states²³ and serves approximately 5.5 million customers, and is publicly-traded under ticker symbol AEP.

Page 1 of Schedule DWD-2 contains comparative capitalization and financial statistics for SWEPCO for the years 2015 to 2019.²⁴ During the five-year period ending 2019, the historically achieved average earnings rate on book common equity for SWEPCO averaged 7.06%. The average common equity ratio based on total permanent capital (excluding short-term debt) was 47.97%, and the average dividend payout ratio was 58.18%.

Total debt to earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization for the years 2015 to 2019 ranges between 3.92 and 5.09 times, with an average of 4.76 times. Funds from operations to total debt range from 11.49% to 19.40%, with an average of 15.58%.

²² See, American Electric Power Company Inc., SEC Form 10-K at 3 (Dec. 31, 2019). The Company also provides wholesale electric service to municipal and electric cooperative customers who serve additional retail customers.

²³ See, American Electric Power Company Inc., SEC Form 10-K at 1 (Dec. 31, 2019). In addition to Texas, AEP also serves customers in Arkansas, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia.

²⁴ Source: SWEPCO FERC Form 1.

| Q. | PLEA | SE EXPLAIN HOW YOU CHOSE THE COMPANIES IN THE UTILITY |
|----|--------|--|
| | PROX | KY GROUP. |
| A. | The co | ompanies selected for the Utility Proxy Group met the following criteria: |
| | (i) | They were included in the Eastern, Central, or Western Electric Utility Group |
| | | of Value Line (Standard Edition); |
| | (ii) | They have 70% or greater of fiscal year 2019 total operating income derived |
| | | from, and 70% or greater of fiscal year 2019 total assets attributable to, |
| | | regulated electric operations; |
| | (iii) | They are vertically integrated (i.e., utilities that own and operate regulated |
| | | generation, transmission, and distribution assets); |
| | (iv) | At the time of preparation of this testimony, they had not publicly announced |
| | | that they were involved in any major merger or acquisition activity (i.e., one |
| | | publicly-traded utility merging with or acquiring another) or any other major |
| | | development; |
| | (v) | They have not cut or omitted their common dividends during the five years |
| | | ended 2019 or through the time of preparation of this testimony; |
| | (vi) | They have Value Line and Bloomberg Professional Services ("Bloomberg") |
| | | adjusted Betas; |
| | (vii) | They have positive Value Line five-year dividends per share ("DPS") growth |
| | | rate projections; and |
| | (viii) | They have Value Line, Zacks, or Yahoo! Finance consensus five-year |
| | | earnings per share ("EPS") growth rate projections. |
| | | The following 14 companies met these criteria: |
| | | PROX A. The co (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) |

Table 3: Utility Proxy Group Companies

| Company Name | Ticker Symbol |
|-----------------------------------|---------------|
| ALLETE, Inc. | ALE |
| Alliant Energy Corporation | LNT |
| Ameren Corporation | AEE |
| Duke Energy Corporation | DUK |
| Edison International | EIX |
| Entergy Corporation | ETR |
| IDACORP, Inc. | IDA |
| NorthWestern Corporation | NWE |
| OGE Energy Corporation | OGE |
| Otter Tail Corporation | OTTR |
| Pinnacle West Capital Corporation | PNW |
| PNM Resources, Inc. | PNM |
| Portland General Electric Co. | POR |
| Xcel Energy, Inc. | XEL |

2 Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE SCHEDULE DWD-2, PAGE 2.

A. Page 2 of Schedule DWD-2 contains comparative capitalization and financial statistics for the Utility Proxy Group for the years 2015 to 2019.

During the five-year period ending 2019, the historically achieved average earnings rate on book common equity for the group averaged 8.60%, the average common equity ratio based on total permanent capital (excluding short-term debt) was 48.33%, and the average dividend payout ratio was 60.94%.

Total debt to earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization for the years 2015 to 2019 ranges between 4.03 and 5.27 times, with an average of 4.62 times. Funds from operations to total debt range from 15.07% to 23.09%, with an average of 19.47%.

| 1 | | VI. <u>CAPITAL STRUCTURE</u> |
|----------------|----|---|
| 2 | Q. | WHAT IS SWEPCO'S REQUESTED CAPITAL STRUCTURE? |
| 3 | A. | SWEPCO's requested capital structure consists of 50.63% long-term debt and |
| 4 | | 49.37% common equity. SWEPCO's requested capital structure is its actual capital |
| 5 | | structure at March 31, 2020, as testified to by Company Witness Hawkins. |
| 6 | Q. | DOES SWEPCO HAVE A SEPARATE CAPITAL STRUCTURE THAT IS |
| 7 | | RECOGNIZED BY INVESTORS? |
| 8 | A. | Yes. SWEPCO is a separate corporate entity that has its own capital structure and |
| 9 | | issues its own debt. SWEPCO's actual capital structure is reflected in registrations |
| 10 | | of its debt with the Securities Exchange Commission. |
| 11 | Q. | WHAT ARE THE TYPICAL SOURCES OF CAPITAL COMMONLY |
| 12 | | CONSIDERED IN ESTABLISHING A UTILITY'S CAPITAL STRUCTURE? |
| 13 | A. | Common equity and long-term debt are commonly considered in establishing a |
| 14 | | utility's capital structure because they are the typical sources of capital financing a |
| 15 | | utility's rate base. |
| 16 | Q. | PLEASE EXPLAIN. |
| 17 | A. | Long-lived assets are typically financed with long-lived securities, so that the overall |
| 18 | | term structure of the utility's long-term liabilities (both debt and equity) closely |
| 19 | | match the life of the assets being financed. As stated by Brigham and Houston: |
| 20 21 22 | | In practice, firms don't finance each specific asset with a type of capital that has a maturity equal to the asset's life. However, academic studies do show that most firms tend to finance short-term |

| assets fro | m sh | ort-term | sources | and | long-term | assets | from | long-ter | m |
|------------|------|----------|---------|-----|-----------|--------|------|----------|---|
| sources.2 | 5 | | | | • | | | | |

Whereas short-term debt has a maturity of one year or less, long-term debt may have maturities of 30 years or longer. Although there are practical financing constraints, such as the need to "stagger" long-term debt maturities, the general objective is to extend the average life of long-term debt. Still, long-term debt has a finite life, which is likely to be less than the life of the assets included in rate base. Common equity, on the other hand, is outstanding into perpetuity. Thus, common equity more accurately matches the life of the going concern of the utility, which is also assumed to operate in perpetuity. Consequently, it is both typical and important for utilities to have significant proportions of common equity in their capital structures.

- Q. WHY IS IT IMPORTANT THAT THE COMPANY'S ACTUAL CAPITAL STRUCTURE, CONSISTING OF 50.63% LONG-TERM DEBT AND 49.37% COMMON EQUITY, BE AUTHORIZED IN THIS PROCEEDING?
- A. In order to provide safe, reliable, and affordable service to its customers, SWEPCO must meet the needs and serve the interests of its various stakeholders, including customers, shareholders, and bondholders. The interests of these stakeholder groups are aligned with maintaining a healthy balance sheet, strong credit ratings, and a supportive regulatory environment, so that the Company has access to capital on reasonable terms in order to make necessary investments.

Eugene F. Brigham and Joel F. Houston, <u>Fundamentals of Financial Management</u>, Concise 4th Ed., Thomson South-Western, 2004, at 574.

| 1 | | Safe and reliable service cannot be maintained at a reasonable cost if utilities |
|----|----|--|
| 2 | | do not have the financial flexibility and strength to access competitive financing |
| 3 | | markets on reasonable terms. The authorization of a capital structure that understates |
| 4 | | the Company's actual common equity will weaken the financial condition of its |
| 5 | | operations and adversely impact the Company's ability to address expenses and |
| 6 | | investments, to the detriment of customers and shareholders. Safe and reliable |
| 7 | | service for customers cannot be sustained over the long term if the interests of |
| 8 | | shareholders and bondholders are minimized such that the public interest is not |
| 9 | | optimized. |
| 10 | Q. | HOW DOES THE COMPANY'S ACTUAL COMMON EQUITY RATIO OF |
| 11 | | 49.37% COMPARE WITH THE COMMON EQUITY RATIOS MAINTAINED BY |
| 12 | | THE UTILITY PROXY GROUP? |
| 13 | A. | The Company's requested ratemaking common equity ratio of 49.37% for SWEPCO |
| 14 | | is reasonable and consistent with the range of common equity ratios maintained by |
| 15 | | the Utility Proxy Group. As shown on pages 3 and 4 of Schedule DWD-2, common |
| 16 | | equity ratios of the utilities range from 35.73% to 58.04% for fiscal year 2019. |
| 17 | | I also considered Value Line projected capital structures for the utilities for |
| 18 | | 2023-2025. As shown in Table 4 below, that analysis shows a range of projected |
| 19 | | common equity ratios between 37.50% and 59.00%. |

Table 4: Value Line Projected Equity Ratios of the Utility Proxy Group²⁶

| | Common Equity |
|-----------------------------------|---------------|
| Company Name | Ratio |
| ALLETE, Inc. | 59.00% |
| Alliant Energy Corporation | 48.00% |
| Ameren Corporation | 50.00% |
| Duke Energy Corporation | 45.00% |
| Edison International | 37.50% |
| Entergy Corporation | 41.00% |
| IDACORP, Inc. | 53.50% |
| North Western Corporation | 50.00% |
| OGE Energy Corporation | 51.50% |
| Otter Tail Corporation | 53.00% |
| Pinnacle West Capital Corporation | 46.50% |
| PNM Resources, Inc. | 49.00% |
| Portland General Electric Co. | 47.50% |
| Xcel Energy, Inc. | 42.50% |

In addition to comparing the Company's actual common equity ratio with common equity ratios currently and expected to be maintained by the Utility Proxy Group, I also compared the Company's actual common equity ratio with the equity ratios maintained by the operating subsidiaries of the Utility Proxy Group companies.

As shown on page 5 of Schedule DWD-2, common equity ratios of the operating utility subsidiaries of the Utility Proxy Group range from 45.23% to 65.22% for fiscal year 2019.

See, pages 2 through 17 of Schedule DWD-3.

- 1 Q. IS SWEPCO'S ACTUAL EQUITY RATIO OF 49.37% APPROPRIATE FOR
- 2 RATEMAKING PURPOSES GIVEN THE RANGE OF THE UTILITY PROXY
- 3 GROUP?

- 4 A. Yes, it is. The Company's actual equity ratio of 49.37% is appropriate for
- 5 ratemaking purposes in the current proceeding because it is within the range of the
- 6 common equity ratios currently maintained and expected to be maintained, by the
- 7 Utility Proxy Group and their operating subsidiaries.

VII. COMMON EQUITY COST RATE MODELS

9 A. Discounted Cash Flow Model

- 10 Q. WHAT IS THE THEORETICAL BASIS OF THE DCF MODEL?
- 11 A. The theory underlying the DCF model is that the present value of an expected future
- stream of net cash flows during the investment holding period can be determined by
- discounting those cash flows at the cost of capital, or the investors' capitalization
- rate. DCF theory indicates that an investor buys a stock for an expected total return
- 15 rate, which is derived from the cash flows received from dividends and market price
- 16 appreciation. Mathematically, the dividend yield on market price plus a growth rate
- equals the capitalization rate; *i.e.*, the total common equity return rate expected by
- investors.
- 19 Q. WHICH VERSION OF THE DCF MODEL DID YOU USE?
- 20 A. I used the single-stage constant growth DCF model in my analyses.

| 2 | | CONSTANT GROWTH DCF MODEL. |
|---|----|--|
| 3 | A. | The unadjusted dividend yields are based on the proxy companies' dividends as of |
| 4 | | July 31, 2020, divided by the average closing market price for the 60 trading days |

PLEASE DESCRIBE THE DIVIDEND YIELD YOU USED IN APPLYING THE

5 ended July 31, 2020.²⁷

O.

6 Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN YOUR ADJUSTMENT TO THE DIVIDEND YIELD.

A. Because dividends are paid periodically (e.g. quarterly), as opposed to continuously (daily), an adjustment must be made to the dividend yield. This is often referred to as the discrete, or the Gordon Periodic, version of the DCF model.

DCF theory calls for using the full growth rate, or D₁, in calculating the model's dividend yield component. Since the companies in the Utility Proxy Group increase their quarterly dividends at various times during the year, a reasonable assumption is to reflect one-half the annual dividend growth rate in the dividend yield component, or D_{1/2}. Because the dividend should be representative of the next 12-month period, this adjustment is a conservative approach that does not overstate the dividend yield. Therefore, the actual average dividend yields in Column 1, page 1 of Schedule DWD-3 have been adjusted upward to reflect one-half the average projected growth rate shown in Column 6.

See, Column 1, page 1 of Schedule DWD-3.

| 1 | Q. | PLEASE EXPLAIN THE BASIS FOR THE GROWTH RATES YOU APPLY TO |
|-----|----|--|
| 2 | | THE UTILITY PROXY GROUP IN YOUR CONSTANT GROWTH DCF MODEL. |
| 3 | A. | Investors with more limited resources than institutional investors are likely to rely on |
| 4 | | widely available financial information services, such as Value Line, Zacks, and |
| 5 | | Yahoo! Finance. Investors realize that analysts have significant insight into the |
| 6 | | dynamics of the industries and individual companies they analyze, as well as |
| 7 | | companies' abilities to effectively manage the effects of changing laws and |
| 8 | | regulations, and ever-changing economic and market conditions. For these reasons, I |
| 9 | | used analysts' five-year forecasts of EPS growth in my DCF analysis. |
| 10 | | Over the long run, there can be no growth in DPS without growth in EPS. |
| 1 1 | | Security analysts' earnings expectations have a more significant influence on market |
| 12 | | prices than dividend expectations. Thus, using projected earnings growth rates in a |
| 13 | | DCF analysis provides a better match between investors' market price appreciation |
| 14 | | expectations and the growth rate component of the DCF. |
| 15 | Q. | PLEASE SUMMARIZE THE CONSTANT GROWTH DCF MODEL RESULTS. |
| 16 | A. | As shown on page 1 of Schedule DWD-3, for the Utility Proxy Group, the mean |
| 17 | | result of applying the single-stage DCF model is 8.63%, the median result is 8.82%, |
| 18 | | and the average of the two is 8.73%. In arriving at a conclusion for the constant |
| 19 | | growth DCF-indicated common equity cost rate for the Utility Proxy Group, I relied |

on an average of the mean and the median results of the DCF.

B. The Risk Premium Model

| 2 | \mathbf{O} | PLEASE DESCRIBE THE THEORETICAL BASIS OF THE RPM |
|---|--------------|--|
| _ | O . | - 1 DDAND DDDCMDD 1 HD 1 HDQMD 10AD DAND OL 1 HD M W |

A. The RPM is based on the fundamental financial principle of risk and return; namely, that investors require greater returns for bearing greater risk. The RPM recognizes that common equity capital has greater investment risk than debt capital, as common equity shareholders are behind debt holders in any claim on a company's assets and earnings. As a result, investors require higher returns from common stocks than from bonds to compensate them for bearing the additional risk.

While it is possible to directly observe bond returns and yields, investors' required common equity returns cannot be directly determined or observed. According to RPM theory, one can estimate a common equity risk premium over bonds (either historically or prospectively), and use that premium to derive a cost rate of common equity. The cost of common equity equals the expected cost rate for long-term debt capital, plus a risk premium over that cost rate, to compensate common shareholders for the added risk of being unsecured and last-in-line for any claim on the corporation's assets and earnings upon liquidation.

- 17 Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN HOW YOU DERIVED YOUR INDICATED COST OF
 18 COMMON EQUITY BASED ON THE RPM.
 - A. To derive my indicated cost of common equity under the RPM, I used two risk premium methods. The first method was the Predictive Risk Premium Model ("PRPM") and the second method was a risk premium model using a total market approach. The PRPM estimates the risk-return relationship directly, while the total

| 1 | market approach indirectly derives a risk premium by using known metrics as a | i |
|---|---|---|
| 2 | proxy for risk. | |

3 Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE PRPM.

A.

The PRPM, published in the *Journal of Regulatory Economics*, ²⁸ was developed from the work of Robert F. Engle, who shared the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2003 "for methods of analyzing economic time series with time-varying volatility" or ARCH. ²⁹ Engle found that volatility changes over time and is related from one period to the next, especially in financial markets. Engle discovered that volatility of prices and returns clusters over time and is therefore highly predictable and can be used to predict future levels of risk and risk premiums.

The PRPM estimates the risk-return relationship directly, as the predicted equity risk premium is generated by predicting volatility or risk. The PRPM is not based on an <u>estimate</u> of investor behavior, but rather on an evaluation of the results of that behavior (*i.e.*, the variance of historical equity risk premiums).

The inputs to the model are the historical returns on the common shares of each Utility Proxy Group company minus the historical monthly yield on long-term U.S. Treasury securities through July 2020. Using a generalized form of ARCH, known as GARCH, I calculated each Utility Proxy Group company's projected equity risk premium using Eviews[©] statistical software. When the GARCH model is applied to the historical return data, it produces a predicted GARCH variance series³⁰

Pauline M. Ahern, Frank J. Hanley and Richard A. Michelfelder, Ph.D. A New Approach for Estimating the Equity Risk Premium for Public Utilities, The Journal of Regulatory Economics (December 2011), 40:261-278.

²⁹ Autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity; See also, www.nobelprize.org.

³⁰ Illustrated on Columns 1 and 2, page 2 of Schedule DWD-4.

and a GARCH coefficient.³¹ Multiplying the predicted monthly variance by the GARCH coefficient and then annualizing it³² produces the predicted annual equity risk premium. I then added the forecasted 30-year U.S. Treasury bond yield of 2.09%³³ to each company's PRPM-derived equity risk premium to arrive at an indicated cost of common equity. The 30-year U.S. Treasury bond yield is a consensus forecast derived from *Blue Chip*.³⁴ The mean PRPM indicated common equity cost rate for the Utility Proxy Group is 10.33%, the median is 10.21%, and the average of the two is 10.27%. Consistent with my reliance on the average of the median and mean results of the DCF models, I relied on the average of the mean and median results of the Utility Proxy Group PRPM to calculate a cost of common equity rate of 10.27%.

12 Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE TOTAL MARKET APPROACH RPM.

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10

- 13 A. The total market approach RPM adds a prospective public utility bond yield to an
 14 average of: 1) an equity risk premium that is derived from a Beta-adjusted total
 15 market equity risk premium, 2) an equity risk premium based on the S&P Utilities
 16 Index, and 3) an equity risk premium based on authorized ROEs for electric utilities.
- Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE BASIS OF THE EXPECTED BOND YIELD OF 3.78%
 APPLICABLE TO THE UTILITY PROXY GROUP.
- 19 A. The first step in the total market approach RPM analysis is to determine the expected 20 bond yield. Because both ratemaking and the cost of capital, including the common

³¹ Illustrated on Column 4, page 2 of Schedule DWD-4.

Annualized Return = $(1 + Monthly Return)^12 - 1$

³³ See, Column 6, page 2 of Schedule DWD-4.

³⁴ See, Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, June 1, 2020 at page 14 and July 31, 2020 at page 2.

| equity cost rate, are prospective in nature, a prospective yield on similarly-rated long- |
|--|
| term debt is essential. I relied on a consensus forecast of about 50 economists of the |
| expected yield on Aaa-rated corporate bonds for the six calendar quarters ending |
| with the fourth calendar quarter of 2021, and Blue Chip's long-term projections for |
| 2022 to 2026, and 2027 to 2031. As shown on line 1, page 3 of Schedule DWD-4, |
| the average expected yield on Moody's Aaa-rated corporate bonds is 3.03%. In |
| order to adjust the expected Aaa-rated corporate bond yield to an equivalent A2-rated |
| public utility bond yield, I made an upward adjustment of 0.61%, which represents a |
| recent spread between Aaa-rated corporate bonds and A2-rated public utility bonds. ³⁵ |
| Adding that recent 0.61% spread to the expected Aaa-rated corporate bond yield of |
| 3.03% results in an expected A2-rated public utility bond yield of 3.64%. Since the |
| Utility Proxy Group's average Moody's long-term issuer rating is A3, another |
| adjustment to the expected A2-rated public utility bond is needed to reflect the |
| difference in bond ratings. An upward adjustment of 0.14%, which represents one- |
| third of a recent spread between A2-rated and Baa2-rated public utility bond yields, |
| is necessary to make the A2 prospective bond yield applicable to an A3-rated public |
| utility bond. ³⁶ Adding the 0.14% to the 3.64% prospective A2-rated public utility |
| bond yield results in a 3.78% expected bond yield applicable to the Utility Proxy |
| Group. |

As shown on line 2 and explained in note 2, page 3 of Schedule DWD-4. As shown on line 4 and explained in note 3, page 3 of Schedule DWD-4.

Table 5: Summary of the Calculation of the Utility Proxy Group Projected Bond Yield³⁷

| Prospective Yield on Moody's Aaa-Rated Corporate Bonds (Blue Chip) | 3.03% |
|---|--------------|
| Adjustment to Reflect Yield Spread Between Moody's Aaa-Rated Corporate Bonds and Moody's A2-Rated Utility Bonds | 0.61% |
| Adjustment to Reflect the Utility Proxy Group's Average Moody's Bond Rating of A3 | 0.14% |
| Prospective Bond Yield Applicable to the Utility Proxy Group | <u>3.78%</u> |

1

- 4 Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN HOW THE BETA-DERIVED EQUITY RISK PREMIUM IS
- 5 DETERMINED.
- A. The components of the Beta-derived risk premium model are: 1) an expected market
 equity risk premium over corporate bonds, and 2) the Beta coefficient. The
 derivation of the Beta-derived equity risk premium that I applied to the Utility Proxy
 Group is shown on lines 1 through 9, on page 8 of Schedule DWD-4. The total Betaderived equity risk premium I applied is based on an average of three historical
 market data-based equity risk premiums, two *Value Line*-based equity risk premiums,
 and a Bloomberg-based equity risk premium. Each of these is described below.
- Q. HOW DID YOU DERIVE A MARKET EQUITY RISK PREMIUM BASED ON
 LONG-TERM HISTORICAL DATA?
- 15 A. To derive an historical market equity risk premium, I used the most recent holding
 16 period returns for the large company common stocks from the Stocks, Bonds, Bills,
 17 and Inflation ("SBBI") Yearbook 2020 ("SBBI 2020")³⁸ less the average historical

³⁷ As shown on page 3 of Schedule DWD-4.

³⁸ See, SBBI-2020 Appendix A Tables: Morningstar Stocks, Bonds, Bills, & Inflation 1926-2019.

| yield on Moody's Aaa/Aa-rated corporate bonds for the period 1928 to 2019. Using |
|--|
| holding period returns over a very long time is appropriate because it is consistent |
| with the long-term investment horizon presumed by investing in a going concern, |
| i.e., a company expected to operate in perpetuity. |

SBBI's long-term arithmetic mean monthly total return rate on large company common stocks was 11.83% and the long-term arithmetic mean monthly yield on Moody's Aaa/Aa-rated corporate bonds was 6.05%. ³⁹ As shown on line 1, page 8 of Schedule DWD-4, subtracting the mean monthly bond yield from the total return on large company stocks results in a long-term historical equity risk premium of 5.78%.

I used the arithmetic mean monthly total return rates for the large company stocks and yields (income returns) for the Moody's Aaa/Aa corporate bonds, because they are appropriate for the purpose of estimating the cost of capital as noted in SBBI - 2020. 40 Using the arithmetic mean return rates and yields is appropriate because historical total returns and equity risk premiums provide insight into the variance and standard deviation of returns needed by investors in estimating future risk when making a current investment. If investors relied on the geometric mean of historical equity risk premiums, they would have no insight into the potential variance of future returns, because the geometric mean relates the change over many periods to a constant rate of change, thereby obviating the year-to-year fluctuations, or variance, which is critical to risk analysis.

³⁹ As explained in note 1, page 9 of Schedule DWD-4.

⁴⁰ See, SBBI - 2020, at page 10-22.

- Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE DERIVATION OF THE REGRESSION-BASED
 MARKET EQUITY RISK PREMIUM.
- A. To derive the regression-based market equity risk premium of 9.34% shown on line 2, page 8 of Schedule DWD-4, I used the same monthly annualized total returns on
- 5 large company common stocks relative to the monthly annualized yields on Moody's
- 6 Aaa/Aa-rated corporate bonds as mentioned above. I modeled the relationship
- 5 between interest rates and the market equity risk premium using the observed
- 8 monthly market equity risk premium as the dependent variable, and the monthly
- 9 yield on Moody's Aaa/Aa-rated corporate bonds as the independent variable. I then
- used a linear Ordinary Least Squares ("OLS") regression, in which the market equity
- risk premium is expressed as a function of the Moody's Aaa/Aa-rated corporate
- bonds yield:

$$RP = \alpha + \beta (R_{Aaa/Aa})$$

- 14 Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE DERIVATION OF THE PRPM EQUITY RISK
- 15 PREMIUM.
- 16 A. I used the same PRPM approach described above to the PRPM equity risk premium.
- 17 The inputs to the model are the historical monthly returns on large company common
- stocks minus the monthly yields on Moody's Aaa/Aa-rated corporate bonds during
- the period from January 1928 through July 2020. 41 Using the previously discussed
- 20 generalized form of ARCH, known as GARCH, the projected equity risk premium is

Data from January 1926 to December 2019 is from <u>SBBI - 2020</u>. Data from January 2020 to July 2020 is from Bloomberg.

| l | | determined using Eviews* statistical software. The resulting PRPM predicted a |
|----|----|--|
| 2 | | market equity risk premium of 9.55%. ⁴² |
| 3 | Q. | PLEASE EXPLAIN THE DERIVATION OF A PROJECTED EQUITY RISK |
| 4 | | PREMIUM BASED ON VALUE LINE DATA FOR YOUR RPM ANALYSIS. |
| 5 | A. | As noted above, because both ratemaking and the cost of capital are prospective, a |
| 6 | | prospective market equity risk premium is needed. The derivation of the forecasted |
| 7 | | or prospective market equity risk premium can be found in note 4, page 8 of |
| 8 | | Schedule DWD-4. Consistent with my calculation of the dividend yield component |
| 9 | | in my DCF analysis, this prospective market equity risk premium is derived from an |
| 10 | | average of the three- to five-year median market price appreciation potential by |
| 11 | | Value Line for the 13 weeks ended July 31, 2020, plus an average of the median |
| 12 | | estimated dividend yield for the common stocks of the 1,700 firms covered in Value |
| 13 | | Line (Standard Edition). ⁴³ |
| 14 | | The average median expected price appreciation is 69%, which translates to a |
| 15 | | 14.02% annual appreciation, and when added to the average of Value Line's median |
| 16 | | expected dividend yields of 2.51%, equates to a forecasted annual total return rate on |
| 17 | | the market of 16.53%. The forecasted Moody's Aaa-rated corporate bond yield of |
| 18 | | 3.03% is deducted from the total market return of 16.53%, resulting in an equity risk |
| 19 | | premium of 13.50%, as shown on line 4, page 8 of Schedule DWD-4. |

⁴²

Shown on line 3, page 8 of Schedule DWD-4. As explained in detail in note 1, page 2 of Schedule DWD-4. 43

| 1 Q | . PLE | ASE | EXPLAIN | THE | DERIVATION | OF | AN | EQUITY | RISK | PREMIUM |
|-----|-------|-----|----------------|-----|------------|----|----|---------------|------|---------|
|-----|-------|-----|----------------|-----|------------|----|----|---------------|------|---------|

- 2 BASED ON THE S&P 500 COMPANIES.
- 3 A. Using data from Value Line, I calculated an expected total return on the S&P 500
- 4 companies using expected dividend yields and long-term growth estimates as a proxy
- 5 for capital appreciation. The expected total return for the S&P 500 is 13.66%.
- 6 Subtracting the prospective yield on Moody's Aaa-rated corporate bonds of 3.03%
- 7 results in a 10.63% projected equity risk premium.
- 8 Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE DERIVATION OF AN EQUITY RISK PREMIUM
- 9 BASED ON BLOOMBERG DATA.
- 10 A. Using data from Bloomberg, I calculated an expected total return on the S&P 500
- using expected dividend yields and long-term growth estimates as a proxy for capital
- 12 appreciation, identical to the method described above. The expected total return for
- the S&P 500 is 13.75%. Subtracting the prospective yield on Moody's Aaa-rated
- corporate bonds of 3.03% results in a 10.72% projected equity risk premium.
- 15 Q. WHAT IS YOUR CONCLUSION OF A BETA-DERIVED EQUITY RISK
- 16 PREMIUM FOR USE IN YOUR RPM ANALYSIS?
- 17 A. I gave equal weight to all six equity risk premiums based on each source historical,
- 18 Value Line, and Bloomberg in arriving at a 9.92% equity risk premium.

Table 6: Summary of the Calculation of the Equity Risk Premium using

Total Market Returns⁴⁴

| Historical Spread Between Total Returns of Large Stocks and Aaa and Aa-Rated Corporate Bond Yields (1928 – 2019) | 5.78% |
|---|--------|
| Regression Analysis on Historical Data | 9.34% |
| PRPM Analysis on Historical Data | 9.55% |
| Prospective Equity Risk Premium using Total Market Returns from <i>Value Line</i> Summary & Index less Projected Aaa Corporate Bond Yields | 13.50% |
| Prospective Equity Risk Premium using Measures of Capital Appreciation and Income Returns from <i>Value Line</i> for the S&P 500 less Projected Aaa Corporate Bond Yields | 10.63% |
| Prospective Equity Risk Premium using Measures of Capital Appreciation and Income Returns from Bloomberg Professional Services for the S&P 500 less Projected Aaa Corporate Bond Yields | 10.72% |
| Average | 9.92% |

After calculating the average market equity risk premium of 9.92%, I adjusted it by the Beta coefficient to account for the risk of the Utility Proxy Group. As discussed below, the Beta coefficient is a meaningful measure of prospective relative risk to the market as a whole, and is a logical way to allocate a company's, or proxy group's, share of the market's total equity risk premium relative to corporate bond yields. As shown on page 1 of Schedule DWD-5, the average of the mean and median Beta coefficient for the Utility Proxy Group is 0.95. Multiplying the 0.95 average Beta coefficient by the market equity risk premium of 9.92% results in a Beta-adjusted equity risk premium for the Utility Proxy Group of 9.42%.

⁴⁴ As shown on page 8 of Schedule DWD-4.

| 1 | Q. | HOW DID YOU DERIVE THE EQUITY RISK PREMIUM BASED ON THE S&P |
|----|----|---|
| 2 | | UTILITY INDEX AND MOODY'S A-RATED PUBLIC UTILITY BONDS? |
| 3 | A. | I estimated three equity risk premiums based on S&P Utility Index holding period |
| 4 | | returns, and two equity risk premiums based on the expected returns of the S&P |
| 5 | | Utilities Index, using Value Line and Bloomberg data, respectively. Turning first to |
| 6 | | the S&P Utility Index holding period returns, I derived a long-term monthly |
| 7 | | arithmetic mean equity risk premium between the S&P Utility Index total returns of |
| 8 | | 10.74% and monthly Moody's A-rated public utility bond yields of 6.53% from 1928 |
| 9 | | to 2019 to arrive at an equity risk premium of 4.21%. ⁴⁵ I then used the same |
| 10 | | historical data to derive an equity risk premium of 6.76% based on a regression of the |
| 11 | | monthly equity risk premiums. The final S&P Utility Index holding period equity |
| 12 | | risk premium involved applying the PRPM using the historical monthly equity risk |
| 13 | | premiums from January 1928 to July 2020 to arrive at a PRPM-derived equity risk |
| 14 | | premium of 5.57% for the S&P Utility Index. |
| 15 | | I then derived expected total returns on the S&P Utilities Index of 10.57% |
| 16 | | and 9.04% using data from Value Line and Bloomberg, respectively, and subtracted |
| 17 | | the prospective Moody's A2-rated public utility bond yield of 3.64% ⁴⁶ , which |
| 18 | | resulted in equity risk premiums of 6.93% and 5.40%, respectively. As with the |
| 19 | | market equity risk premiums, I averaged each risk premium based on each source |
| 20 | | (i.e., historical, Value Line, and Bloomberg) to arrive at my utility-specific equity |

risk premium of 5.77%.

As shown on line 1, page 12 of Schedule DWD-4.

Derived on line 3, page 3 of Schedule DWD-4.

Table 7: Summary of the Calculation of the Equity Risk Premium using S&P Utility Index Holding Returns⁴⁷

| Historical Spread Between Total Returns of the S&P | |
|--|--------|
| Utilities Index and A2-Rated Utility Bond Yields (1928 – | 4.21% |
| 2019) | |
| Regression Analysis on Historical Data | 6.76% |
| PRPM Analysis on Historical Data | 5.57% |
| Prospective Equity Risk Premium using Measures of | |
| Capital Appreciation and Income Returns from <i>Value Line</i> for the S&P Utilities Index less Projected A2 Utility | 6.93% |
| Bond Yields | |
| Prospective Equity Risk Premium using Measures of | |
| Capital Appreciation and Income Returns from | 5.40% |
| Bloomberg Professional Services for the S&P Utilities | 3.4070 |
| Index less Projected A2 Utility Bond Yields | |
| Average | 5.77% |

3 Q. HOW DO YOU DERIVE AN EQUITY RISK PREMIUM OF 5.88% BASED ON

4 AUTHORIZED ROES FOR ELECTRIC UTILITIES?

A.

The equity risk premium of 5.88% shown on line 3, page 7 of Schedule DWD-4 is the result of a regression analysis based on regulatory awarded ROEs related to the yields on Moody's A2-rated public utility bonds. That analysis is shown on page 13 of Schedule DWD-4. Page 13 of Schedule DWD-4 contains the graphical results of a regression analysis of 1,167 rate cases for electric utilities which were fully litigated during the period from January 1, 1980 through July 31, 2019. It shows the implicit equity risk premium relative to the yields on A2-rated public utility bonds immediately prior to the issuance of each regulatory decision. It is readily discernible that there is an inverse relationship between the yield on A2-rated public utility bonds and equity risk premiums. In other words, as interest rates decline, the equity risk premium rises and vice versa, a result consistent with financial literature

⁴⁷ As shown on page 12 of Schedule DWD-4.

| 1 | | on the subject. ⁴⁸ I used the regression results to estimate the equity risk premium |
|----|----|---|
| 2 | | applicable to the projected yield on Moody's A2-rated public utility bonds. Given |
| 3 | | the expected A2-rated utility bond yield of 3.64%, it can be calculated that the |
| 4 | | indicated equity risk premium applicable to that bond yield is 5.88%, which is shown |
| 5 | | on line 3, page 7 of Schedule DWD-4. |
| 6 | Q. | WHAT IS YOUR CONCLUSION OF AN EQUITY RISK PREMIUM FOR USE IN |
| 7 | | YOUR TOTAL MARKET APPROACH RPM ANALYSIS? |
| 8 | A. | The equity risk premium I apply to the Utility Proxy Group is 7.02%, which is the |
| 9 | | average of the Beta-adjusted equity risk premium for the Utility Proxy Group, the |
| 10 | | S&P Utilities Index, and the authorized return utility equity risk premiums of |
| 11 | | 9.42%, 5.77%, and 5.88%, respectively. ⁴⁹ |
| 12 | Q. | WHAT IS THE INDICATED RPM COMMON EQUITY COST RATE BASED ON |
| 13 | | THE TOTAL MARKET APPROACH? |
| 14 | A. | As shown on line 7, page 3 of Schedule DWD-4 and shown on Table 8, below, I |

calculated a common equity cost rate of 10.80% for the Utility Proxy Group based on

the total market approach RPM.

15

See, e.g., Robert S. Harris and Felicia C. Marston, *The Market Risk Premium Expectational Estimates Using Analysts' Forecasts*, <u>Journal of Applied Finance</u>, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2001, at 11-12; Eugene F. Brigham, Dilip K. Shome, and Steve R. Vinson, *The Risk Premium Approach to Measuring a Utility's Cost of Equity*, <u>Financial Management</u>, Spring 1985, at 33-45.

As shown on page 7 of Schedule DWD-4.

Table 8: Summary of the Total Market Return Risk Premium Model⁵⁰

| Prospective Moody's A3-Rated Utility Bond Applicable to the Utility Proxy Group | 3.78% |
|---|---------------|
| Prospective Equity Risk Premium | 7.02% |
| Indicated Cost of Common Equity | <u>10.80%</u> |

2 Q. WHAT ARE THE RESULTS OF YOUR APPLICATION OF THE PRPM AND

3 THE TOTAL MARKET APPROACH RPM?

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- 4 A. As shown on page 1 of Schedule DWD-4, the indicated RPM-derived common
- 5 equity cost rate is 10.54%, which gives equal weight to the PRPM (10.27%) and the
- 6 adjusted-market approach results (10.80%).

C. The Capital Asset Pricing Model

8 Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE THEORETICAL BASIS OF THE CAPM.

- A. CAPM theory defines risk as the co-variability of a security's returns with the market's returns as measured by the Beta coefficient (β). A Beta coefficient less than
 1.0 indicates lower variability than the market as a whole, while a Beta coefficient
- greater than 1.0 indicates greater variability than the market.

The CAPM assumes that all non-market or unsystematic risk can be eliminated through diversification. The risk that cannot be eliminated through diversification is called market, or systematic, risk. In addition, the CAPM presumes that investors only require compensation for systematic risk, which is the result of macroeconomic and other events that affect the returns on all assets. The model is applied by adding a risk-free rate of return to a market risk premium, which is adjusted proportionately to reflect the systematic risk of the individual security


As shown on page 3 of Schedule DWD-4.

| 1 | relative to the total market as measured by the Beta coefficient. The traditional | | | | | |
|----|---|------------------|-----------|--|--|--|
| 2 | CAPM model is expressed as: | | | | | |
| 3 | | | R_{s} | $= R_f + \beta (R_m - R_f)$ | | |
| 4 | Where: | R_s | = | Return rate on the common stock; | | |
| 5 | | R_{f} | = | Risk-free rate of return; | | |
| 6 | | R_{m} | = | Return rate on the market as a whole; and | | |
| 7 | | β | = | Adjusted Beta coefficient (volatility of the | | |
| 8 | | | | security relative to the market as a whole) | | |
| 9 | Nume | erous te | sts of th | e CAPM have measured the extent to which security | | |
| 10 | returns and B | eta coe | fficients | s are related as predicted by the CAPM, confirming its | | |
| 11 | validity. The empirical CAPM ("ECAPM") reflects the reality that while the results | | | | | |
| 12 | of these tests | support | the noti | on that the Beta coefficient is related to security returns, | | |
| 13 | the empirical | Securit | y Marke | et Line ("SML") described by the CAPM formula is not | | |
| 14 | as steeply slo | ped as 1 | the pred | icted SML. ⁵¹ | | |
| 15 | The E | ECAPM | reflects | s this empirical reality. Fama and French clearly state | | |
| 16 | regarding Figure 2, below, that "[t]he returns on the low beta portfolios are too high, | | | | | |
| 17 | and the returns on the high beta portfolios are too low."52 | | | | | |

Roger A. Morin, <u>New Regulatory Finance</u>, at page 175 ("Morin"). Eugene F. Fama and Kenneth R. French, *The Capital Asset Pricing Model Theory and Evidence*, <u>Journal of Economic Perspectives</u>, Vol. 18, No. 3, Summer 2004 at 33 ("Fama & French").

Figure~2 http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/0895330042162430

Average Annualized Monthly Return versus Beta for Value Weight Portfolios Formed on Prior Beta, 1928–2003



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In addition, Morin observes that while the results of these tests support the

notion that Beta is related to security returns, the empirical SML described by the

CAPM formula is not as steeply sloped as the predicted SML. Morin states:

With few exceptions, the empirical studies agree that ... low-beta securities earn returns somewhat higher than the CAPM would predict, and high-beta securities earn less than predicted.⁵³

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14 15 Therefore, the empirical evidence suggests that the expected return on a security is related to its risk by the following approximation:

$$K = R_F + x (R_M - R_F) + (1-x) \beta (R_M - R_F)$$

where x is a fraction to be determined empirically. The value of x that best explains the observed relationship [is] Return = $0.0829 + 0.0520 \beta$ is between 0.25 and 0.30. If x = 0.25, the equation becomes:

⁵³ Morin, at 175.

| I | | $K = K_F + 0.25(K_M - K_F) + 0.75 \beta(K_M - K_F)^{3}$ |
|----|----|---|
| 2 | | Fama and French provide similar support for the ECAPM when they state: |
| 3 | | The early tests firmly reject the Sharpe-Lintner version of the |
| 4 | | CAPM. There is a positive relation between beta and average |
| 5 | | return, but it is too 'flat.' The regressions consistently find that |
| 6 | | the intercept is greater than the average risk-free rate and the |
| 7 | | coefficient on beta is less than the average excess market return |
| 8 | | This is true in the early tests as well as in more recent cross- |
| 9 | | section regressions tests, like Fama and French (1992). ⁵⁵ |
| 10 | | Finally, Fama and French further note: |
| 11 | | Confirming earlier evidence, the relation between beta and average |
| 12 | | return for the ten portfolios is much flatter than the Sharpe-Linter |
| 13 | | CAPM predicts. The returns on low beta portfolios are too high, |
| 14 | | and the returns on the high beta portfolios are too low. For |
| 15 | | example, the predicted return on the portfolio with the lowest beta |
| 16 | | is 8.3 percent per year; the actual return as 11.1 percent. The |
| 17 | | predicted return on the portfolio with the t beta is 16.8 percent per |
| 18 | | year; the actual is 13.7 percent. ⁵⁶ |
| 19 | | Clearly, the justification from Morin, Fama, and French, along with their |
| 20 | | reviews of other academic research on the CAPM, validate the use of the ECAPM. |
| 21 | | In view of theory and practical research, I have applied both the traditional CAPM |
| 22 | | and the ECAPM to the companies in the Utility Proxy Group and averaged the |
| 23 | | results. |
| 24 | Q. | WHAT BETA COEFFICIENTS DID YOU USE IN YOUR CAPM ANALYSIS? |
| 25 | A. | For the Beta coefficients in my CAPM analysis, I considered two sources: Value Line |
| 26 | | and Bloomberg Professional Services. While both of those services adjust their |
| 27 | | calculated (or "raw") Beta coefficients to reflect the tendency of the Beta coefficient |

⁵⁴ Morin, at 190.

Fama & French, at 32.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, at 33.

| 1 | | to regress to the market mean of 1.00, Value Line calculates the Beta coefficient over |
|----|----|---|
| 2 | | a five-year period, while Bloomberg calculates it over a two-year period. |
| 3 | Q. | PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR SELECTION OF A RISK-FREE RATE OF RETURN. |
| 4 | A. | As shown in Column 5, page 1 of Schedule DWD-5, the risk-free rate adopted for |
| 5 | | both applications of the CAPM is 2.09%. This risk-free rate is based on the average |
| 6 | | of the Blue Chip consensus forecast of the expected yields on 30-year U.S. Treasury |
| 7 | | bonds for the six quarters ending with the fourth calendar quarter of 2021, and long- |
| 8 | | term projections for the years 2022 to 2026 and 2027 to 2031. |
| 9 | Q. | WHY IS THE YIELD ON LONG-TERM U.S. TREASURY BONDS |
| 10 | | APPROPRIATE FOR USE AS THE RISK-FREE RATE? |
| 11 | A. | The yield on long-term U.S. Treasury bonds is almost risk-free and its term is |
| 12 | | consistent with the long-term cost of capital to public utilities measured by the yields |
| 13 | | on Moody's A-rated public utility bonds; the long-term investment horizon inherent |
| 14 | | in utilities' common stocks; and the long-term life of the jurisdictional rate base to |
| 15 | | which the allowed fair rate of return (i.e., cost of capital) will be applied. In contrast, |
| 16 | | short-term U.S. Treasury yields are more volatile and largely a function of Federal |
| 17 | | Reserve monetary policy. |

- 18 Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE ESTIMATION OF THE EXPECTED RISK PREMIUM
- 19 FOR THE MARKET USED IN YOUR CAPM ANALYSES.
- 20 A. The basis of the market risk premium is explained in detail in note 1 on Schedule
- DWD-5. As discussed above, the market risk premium is derived from an average of

three historical data-based market risk premiums, two *Value Line* data-based market risk premiums, and one Bloomberg data-based market risk premium.

The long-term income return on U.S. Government securities of 5.09% was deducted from the <u>SBBI - 2020</u> monthly historical total market return of 12.10%, which results in an historical market equity risk premium of 7.01%. ⁵⁷ I applied a linear OLS regression to the monthly annualized historical returns on the S&P 500 relative to historical yields on long-term U.S. Government securities from <u>SBBI - 2020</u>. That regression analysis yielded a market equity risk premium of 10.20%. The PRPM market equity risk premium is 10.67%, and is derived using the PRPM relative to the yields on long-term U.S. Treasury securities from January 1926 through July 2020.

The *Value Line*-derived forecasted total market equity risk premium is derived by deducting the forecasted risk-free rate of 2.09%, discussed above, from the *Value Line* projected total annual market return of 16.53%, resulting in a forecasted total market equity risk premium of 14.44%. The S&P 500 projected market equity risk premium using *Value Line* data is derived by subtracting the projected risk-free rate of 2.09% from the projected total return of the S&P 500 of 13.66%. The resulting market equity risk premium is 11.57%.

The S&P 500 projected market equity risk premium using Bloomberg data is derived by subtracting the projected risk-free rate of 2.09% from the projected total return of the S&P 500 of 13.75%. The resulting market equity risk premium is 11.66%. These six measures, when averaged, result in an average total market equity

⁵⁷ SBBI - 2020, at Appendix A-1 (1) through A-1 (3) and Appendix A-7 (19) through A-7 (21).

1 risk premium of 10.92%.

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Table 9: Summary of the Calculation of the Market Risk Premium for use in the CAPM⁵⁸

| Historical Spread Between Total Returns of Large Stocks and Long-Term Government Bond Yields (1926 – 2019) | 7.01% |
|--|--------|
| Regression Analysis on Historical Data | 10.20% |
| PRPM Analysis on Historical Data | 10.67% |
| Prospective Equity Risk Premium using Total Market Returns from <i>Value Line</i> Summary & Index less Projected 30-Year Treasury Bond Yields | 14.44% |
| Prospective Equity Risk Premium using Measures of Capital Appreciation and Income Returns from <i>Value Line</i> for the S&P 500 less Projected 30-Year Treasury Bond Yields | 11.57% |
| Prospective Equity Risk Premium using Measures of Capital Appreciation and Income Returns from Bloomberg Professional Services for the S&P 500 less Projected 30-Year Treasury Bond Yields | 11.66% |
| Average | 10.92% |

- 4 Q. WHAT ARE THE RESULTS OF YOUR APPLICATION OF THE TRADITIONAL
- 5 AND EMPIRICAL CAPM TO THE UTILITY PROXY GROUP?
- 6 A. As shown on page 1 of Schedule DWD-5, the mean result of my CAPM/ECAPM
- analyses is 12.61%, the median is 12.30%, and the average of the two is 12.46%.
- 8 Consistent with my reliance on the average of mean and median DCF results
- 9 discussed above, the indicated common equity cost rate using the CAPM/ECAPM is
- 10 12.46%.

As shown on page 2 of Schedule DWD-5.

| 1 2 | | D. Common Equity Cost Rates for a Proxy Group of Domestic, Non- Price Regulated Companies Based on the DCF, RPM, and CAPM |
|-----|----|--|
| 3 | Q. | WHY DO YOU ALSO CONSIDER A PROXY GROUP OF DOMESTIC, NON- |
| 4 | | PRICE REGULATED COMPANIES? |
| 5 | A. | In the Hope and Bluefield cases, the U.S. Supreme Court did not specify that |
| 6 | | comparable risk companies had to be utilities. Since the purpose of rate regulation is |
| 7 | | to be a substitute for marketplace competition, non-price regulated firms operating in |
| 8 | | the competitive marketplace make an excellent proxy if they are comparable in total |
| 9 | | risk to the Utility Proxy Group being used to estimate the cost of common equity. |
| 10 | | The selection of such domestic, non-price regulated competitive firms theoretically |
| 11 | | and empirically results in a proxy group which is comparable in total risk to the |
| 12 | | Utility Proxy Group, since all of these companies compete for capital in the exact |
| 13 | | same markets. |
| 14 | Q. | HOW DID YOU SELECT NON-PRICE REGULATED COMPANIES THAT ARE |
| 15 | | COMPARABLE IN TOTAL RISK TO THE UTILITY PROXY GROUP? |
| 16 | A. | In order to select a proxy group of domestic, non-price regulated companies similar |
| 17 | | in total risk to the Utility Proxy Group, I relied on the Beta coefficients and related |
| 18 | | statistics derived from Value Line regression analyses of weekly market prices over |
| 19 | | the most recent 260 weeks (i.e., five years). These selection criteria resulted in a |
| 20 | | proxy group of 45 domestic, non-price regulated firms comparable in total risk to the |
| 21 | | Utility Proxy Group. Total risk is the sum of non-diversifiable market risk and |
| 22 | | diversifiable company-specific risks. The criteria used in selecting the domestic, |
| 23 | | non-price regulated firms was: |

| İ | | (i) They must be covered by <i>Value Line</i> (Standard Edition); |
|----|----|---|
| 2 | | (ii) They must be domestic, non-price regulated companies, <i>i.e.</i> , not utilities; |
| 3 | | (iii) Their Beta coefficients must lie within plus or minus two standard deviations |
| 4 | | of the average unadjusted Beta coefficients of the Utility Proxy Group; and |
| 5 | | (iv) The residual standard errors of the Value Line regressions which gave rise to |
| 6 | | the unadjusted Beta coefficients must lie within plus or minus two standard |
| 7 | | deviations of the average residual standard error of the Utility Proxy Group. |
| 8 | | Beta coefficients measure market, or systematic, risk, which is not |
| 9 | | diversifiable. The residual standard errors of the regressions measure each firm's |
| 10 | | company-specific, diversifiable risk. Companies that have similar Beta coefficients |
| 11 | | and similar residual standard errors resulting from the same regression analyses have |
| 12 | | similar total investment risk. |
| 13 | Q. | HAVE YOU PREPARED A SCHEDULE WHICH SHOWS THE DATA FROM |
| 14 | | WHICH YOU SELECTED THE 45 DOMESTIC, NON-PRICE REGULATED |
| 15 | | COMPANIES THAT ARE COMPARABLE IN TOTAL RISK TO THE UTILITY |
| 16 | | PROXY GROUP? |
| 17 | A. | Yes, the basis of my selection and both proxy groups' regression statistics are shown |
| 18 | | in Schedule DWD-6. |
| 19 | Q. | DID YOU CALCULATE COMMON EQUITY COST RATES USING THE DCF |
| 20 | Q. | MODEL, RPM, AND CAPM FOR THE NON-PRICE REGULATED PROXY |
| 21 | | GROUP? |
| 22 | A. | Yes. Because the DCF model, RPM, and CAPM have been applied in an identical |
| 23 | Λ. | • |
| 23 | | manner as described above, I will not repeat the details of the rationale and |

| 1 | application of each model. One exception is in the application of the RPM, where |
|----|---|
| 2 | did not use public utility-specific equity risk premiums, nor did I apply the PRPM to |
| 3 | the individual non-price regulated companies. |
| 4 | Page 2 of Schedule DWD-7 derives the constant growth DCF model commor |
| 5 | equity cost rate. As shown, the indicated common equity cost rate, using the |
| 6 | constant growth DCF for the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group comparable in tota |
| 7 | risk to the Utility Proxy Group, is 11.50%. |
| 8 | Pages 3 through 5 of Schedule DWD-7 contain the data and calculations that |
| 9 | support the 12.86% RPM common equity cost rate. As shown on line 1, page 3 of |
| 10 | Schedule DWD-7, the consensus prospective yield on Moody's Baa-rated corporate |
| 11 | bonds for the six quarters ending in the fourth quarter of 2021, and for the years 2022 |
| 12 | to 2026 and 2027 to 2031, is 4.18%. ⁵⁹ Since the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group |
| 13 | has an average Moody's long-term issuer rating of A3/Baa1, a downward adjustment |
| 14 | of 0.35% to the projected Baa2-rated corporate bond yield is necessary to reflect the |
| 15 | difference in ratings which results in a projected A3/Baa1-rated corporate bond yield |
| 16 | of 3.83%. |
| 17 | When the Beta-adjusted risk premium of 9.03% ⁶⁰ relative to the Non-Price |
| 18 | Regulated Proxy Group is added to the prospective A3/Baa1-rated corporate bond |
| 19 | yield of 3.83%, the indicated RPM common equity cost rate is 12.86%. |

Page 6 of Schedule DWD-7 contains the inputs and calculations that support my indicated CAPM/ECAPM common equity cost rate of 12.09%.

20

Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, June 1, 2020, at page 14 and July 31, 2020, at page 2. Derived on page 5 of Schedule DWD-7. 59

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| 1 | Q. | WHAT IS THE COST RATE OF COMMON EQUITY BASED ON THE NON- |
|----|----|--|
| 2 | | PRICE REGULATED PROXY GROUP COMPARABLE IN TOTAL RISK TO |
| 3 | | THE UTILITY PROXY GROUP? |
| 4 | A. | As shown on page 1 of Schedule DWD-7, the results of the common equity models |
| 5 | | applied to the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group - which group is comparable in |
| 6 | | total risk to the Utility Proxy Group – are as follows: 11.50% (DCF), 12.86% (RPM), |
| 7 | | and 12.09% (CAPM). The average of the mean and median of these models is |
| 8 | | 12.12%, which I used as the indicated common equity cost rates for the Non-Price |
| 9 | | Regulated Proxy Group. |
| 0 | | VIII. CONCLUSION OF COMMON EQUITY COST RATE BEFORE ADJUSTMENTS |
| 2 | Q. | WHAT IS THE INDICATED COMMON EQUITY COST RATE BEFORE |
| 3 | | ADJUSTMENTS? |
| 4 | A. | By applying multiple cost of common equity models to the Utility Proxy Group and |
| 5 | | the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group, the indicated range of common equity cost |
| 6 | | rates attributable to the Utility Proxy Group before any relative risk adjustments is |
| 7 | | between 9.85% and 10.96%. I used multiple cost of common equity models as |
| 8 | | primary tools in arriving at my recommended common equity cost rate, because no |
| 9 | | single model is so inherently precise that it can be relied on to the exclusion of other |
| 20 | | theoretically sound models. Using multiple models adds reliability to the estimated |
| 21 | | common equity cost rate, with the prudence of using multiple cost of common equity |
| 22 | | models supported in both the financial literature and regulatory precedent. |
| 23 | | Based on these common equity cost rate results, I conclude that a range of |
| 24 | | common equity cost rates between 9.85% and 10.96% is reasonable and appropriate |

| 1 | | before any adjustments for relative risk differences between SWEPCO and the |
|----|----|---|
| 2 | | Utility Proxy Group are made. The bottom of the indicated range (i.e., 9.85%) was |
| 3 | | calculated by averaging the average of all model results (10.96%) with the lowest |
| 4 | | model result (8.73%), and the top of the indicated range is the approximate average |
| 5 | | of all model results. I have chosen this indicated range of common equity cost rates |
| 6 | | applicable to the Utility Proxy Group in order to be conservative in view of current |
| 7 | | market volatility and uncertainty as discussed previously. |
| 8 | | IX. ADJUSTMENTS TO THE COMMON EQUITY COST RATE |
| 9 | | A. Size Adjustment |
| 10 | Q. | DOES SWEPCO'S SMALLER SIZE RELATIVE TO THE UTILITY PROXY |
| 11 | | GROUP COMPANIES INCREASE ITS BUSINESS RISK? |
| 12 | A. | Yes. SWEPCO's smaller size relative to the Utility Proxy Group companies |
| 13 | | indicates greater relative business risk for the Company because, all else being equal, |
| 14 | | size has a material bearing on risk. |
| 15 | | Size affects business risk because smaller companies generally are less able |
| 16 | | to cope with significant events that affect sales, revenues and earnings. For example, |
| 17 | | smaller companies face more risk exposure to business cycles and economic |
| 18 | | conditions, both nationally and locally. Additionally, the loss of revenues from a few |
| 19 | | larger customers would have a greater effect on a small company than on a bigger |
| 20 | | company with a larger, more diverse, customer base. |
| 21 | | As further evidence that smaller firms are riskier, investors generally demand |
| 22 | | greater returns from smaller firms to compensate for less marketability and liquidity |
| 23 | | of their securities. Duff & Phelps' 2020 Valuation Handbook – U.S. Guide to Cost |

| 1 | of Capital (" $\underline{D\&P-2020}$ ") discusses the nature of the small-size phenomenon, |
|---|---|
| 2 | providing an indication of the magnitude of the size premium based on several |
| 3 | measures of size. In discussing "Size as a Predictor of Equity Returns," <u>D&P - 2020</u> |
| 4 | states: |
| 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 | The size effect is based on the empirical observation that companies of smaller size are associated with greater risk and, therefore, have greater cost of capital [sic]. The "size" of a company is one of the most important risk elements to consider when developing cost of equity capital estimates for use in valuing a business simply because size has been shown to be a <i>predictor</i> of equity returns. In other words, there is a significant (negative) relationship between size and historical equity returns - as size <i>decreases</i> , returns tend to <i>increase</i> , and vice versa. (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original) ⁶¹ |
| 14 | Furthermore, in "The Capital Asset Pricing Model: Theory and Evidence," |
| 15 | Fama and French note size is indeed a risk factor which must be reflected when |
| 16 | estimating the cost of common equity. On page 14, they note: |
| 17 18 19 20 | the higher average returns on small stocks and high book-to-market stocks reflect unidentified state variables that produce undiversifiable risks (covariances) in returns not captured in the market return and are priced separately from market betas. 62 |
| 21 | Based on this evidence, Fama and French proposed their three-factor model |
| 22 | which includes a size variable in recognition of the effect size has on the cost of |
| 23 | common equity. |
| 24 | Also, it is a basic financial principle that the use of funds invested, and not |
| 25 | the source of funds, is what gives rise to the risk of any investment. 63 Eugene |
| 26 | Brigham, a well-known authority, states: |
| 27 | A number of researchers have observed that portfolios of small-firms |
| | |

⁶¹ Duff & Phelps Valuation Handbook – U.S. Guide to Cost of Capital, Wiley 2020, at 4-1.

⁶² Fama & French, at 25-43.

⁶³ Brealey, Richard A. and Myers, Stewart C., Principles of Corporate Finance (McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1996), at 204-205, 229.

| 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 | | (sic) have earned consistently higher average returns than those of large-firm stocks; this is called the "small-firm effect." On the surface, it would seem to be advantageous to the small firms to provide average returns in a stock market that are higher than those of larger firms. In reality, it is bad news for the small firm; what the small-firm effect means is that the capital market demands higher returns on stocks of small firms than on otherwise similar stocks of the large firms. (emphasis added) ⁶⁴ |
|--------------------------------------|----|--|
| 9 | | Consistent with the financial principle of risk and return discussed above, |
| 10 | | increased relative risk due to small size must be considered in the allowed rate of |
| 11 | | return on common equity. Therefore, the Commission's authorization of a cost rate |
| 12 | | of common equity in this proceeding must appropriately reflect the unique risks of |
| 13 | | SWEPCO, including its small relative size, which is justified and supported above by |
| 14 | | evidence in the financial literature. |
| 15 | Q. | IS THERE A WAY TO QUANTIFY A RELATIVE RISK ADJUSTMENT DUE TO |
| 16 | | SWEPCO'S SMALL SIZE WHEN COMPARED TO THE UTILITY PROXY |
| 17 | | GROUP? |
| 18 | A. | Yes. SWEPCO has greater relative risk than the average utility in the Utility Proxy |
| 19 | | Group because of its smaller size, as measured by an estimated market capitalization |

of common equity for SWEPCO.

Brigham, Eugene F., <u>Fundamentals of Financial Management</u>, <u>Fifth Edition</u> (The Dryden Press, 1989), at 623.

Table 10: Size as Measured by Market Capitalization for SWEPCO's Electric Operations and the Utility Proxy Group

| | Market Capitalization* (\$ Millions) | Times Greater than The Company |
|---------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| SWEPCO | \$1,709 | |
| Utility Proxy Group | \$14,860 | 8.7x |
| *From page 1 of Schedule DWD-8. | | |

SWEPCO's estimated market capitalization was \$1,709 million as of July 31, 2020, compared with the market capitalization of the average company in the Utility Proxy Group of \$14,860 million as of July 31, 2020. The average company in the Utility Proxy Group has a market capitalization 8.7 times the size of SWEPCO's estimated market capitalization.

As a result, it is necessary to upwardly adjust the indicated range of common equity cost rates attributable to the Utility Proxy Group to reflect SWEPCO's greater risk due to their smaller relative size. The determination is based on the size premiums for portfolios of New York Stock Exchange, American Stock Exchange, and NASDAQ listed companies ranked by deciles for the 1926 to 2019 period. The average size premium for the Utility Proxy Group with a market capitalization of \$14,860 million falls in the second decile, while the Company's estimated market capitalization of \$1,709 million places it in the sixth decile. The size premium spread between the second decile and the sixth decile is 0.84%. Even though an 0.84% upward size adjustment is indicated, I applied a size premium of 0.20% to the Company's indicated common equity cost rate.

| 1 | Q. | SINCE SWEPCO IS PART OF A LARGER COMPANY, WHY IS THE SIZE OF |
|----------|----|---|
| 2 | | THE TOTAL COMPANY NOT MORE APPROPRIATE TO USE WHEN |
| 3 | | DETERMINING THE SIZE ADJUSTMENT? |
| 4 | A. | The return derived in this proceeding will not apply to AEP's operations as a whole, |
| 5 | | but only SWEPCO's. AEP is the sum of its constituent parts, including those |
| 6 | | constituent parts' ROEs. Potential investors in the Parent are aware that it is a |
| 7 | | combination of operations in each state, and that each state's operations experience |
| 8 | | the operating risks specific to their jurisdiction. The market's expectation of AEP's |
| 9 | | return is commensurate with the realities of the Company's composite operations in |
| 10 | | each of the states in which it operates. |
| 11 | | B. Credit Risk Adjustment |
| 12 | Q. | PLEASE DISCUSS YOUR PROPOSED CREDIT RISK ADJUSTMENT. |
| 13 | A. | SWEPCO's long-term issuer ratings are Baa2 and A- from Moody's Investors |
| 14 | | Services and S&P, respectively, compared to the average long-term issuer ratings for |
| 15 | | the Utility Proxy Group of A3 and BBB+, respectively.65 Hence, an upward credit |
| | | |
| 16 | | risk adjustment is necessary to reflect the lower credit rating, i.e., Baa2, of SWEPCO |
| 16 17 | | risk adjustment is necessary to reflect the lower credit rating, <i>i.e.</i> , Baa2, of SWEPCO relative to the A3 average Moody's bond rating of the Utility Proxy Group. ⁶⁶ |

An indication of the magnitude of the necessary upward adjustment to reflect the greater credit risk inherent in a Baa2 bond rating relative to the Utility Proxy Group average rating of A3 is two-thirds of a recent three-month average spread between Moody's A2 and Baa2-rated public utility bond yields of 0.41%, shown on

18

19

20

21

Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence.

As shown on page 5 of Schedule DWD-4.

| 1 | | page 4 of Schedule DWD-4, or 0.27%. ⁶⁷ |
|----|----|---|
| 2 | | C. Flotation Costs |
| 3 | Q. | DID YOU PERFORM ANY ANALYSES RELATED TO FLOTATION COSTS IN |
| 4 | | ESTIMATING THE COMPANY'S ROE? |
| 5 | A. | No, I did not. While flotation costs are necessary expenses associated with obtaining |
| 6 | | the capital used to finance utility assets (and, therefore, should be considered in |
| 7 | | determining the ROE), I recognize that the Commission typically has not included |
| 8 | | flotation costs in arriving at its ROE determinations. Consequently, I have not |
| 9 | | performed any analyses regarding flotation costs in this proceeding. |
| 10 | Q. | WHAT IS THE INDICATED COST OF COMMON EQUITY AFTER YOUR |
| 11 | | COMPANY-SPECIFIC ADJUSTMENTS? |
| 12 | A. | Applying the 0.20% size adjustment and the 0.27% credit risk adjustment, to the |
| 13 | | indicated range of common equity cost rates between 9.85% and 10.96% results in a |
| 14 | | Company-specific range of common equity rates between 10.32% and 11.43%. In |
| 15 | | consideration of both of these indicated ranges, I recommend an ROE of 10.35% for |
| 16 | | SWEPCO in this proceeding. |
| 17 | | X. <u>CONCLUSION</u> |
| 18 | Q. | WHAT IS YOUR RECOMMENDED ROE FOR SWEPCO? |
| 19 | A. | Given the discussion above and the results from the analyses, I recommend that an |
| 20 | | ROE of 10.35% is appropriate for the Company at this time. |

⁶⁷ 0.27% = 0.41% * (2/3).

- 1 Q. IN YOUR OPINION, IS YOUR PROPOSED ROE OF 10.35% FAIR AND
- 2 REASONABLE TO SWEPCO AND ITS CUSTOMERS?
- 3 A. Yes, it is.
- 4 Q. IN YOUR OPINION, IS SWEPCO'S PROPOSED CAPITAL STRUCTURE
- 5 CONSISTING OF 50.63% LONG-TERM DEBT AND 49.37% COMMON
- 6 EQUITY FAIR AND REASONABLE?
- 7 A. Yes, it is.
- 8 Q. DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR DIRECT TESTIMONY?
- 9 A. Yes, it does.

Southwestern Electric Power Company Table of Contents Supporting Schedules Accompanying the Direct Testimony of Dylan W. D'Ascendis, CRRA, CVA

| | <u>Schedule</u> |
|---|-----------------|
| Summary of Cost of Capital and Fair Rate of Return | DWD-1 |
| Financial Profile of the Utility Proxy Group | DWD-2 |
| Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate Using the Discounted Cash Flow Model | DWD-3 |
| Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate Using the Risk Premium Model | DWD-4 |
| Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate Using the Capital Asset Pricing Model | DWD-5 |
| Basis of selection for the Non-Price Regulated Companies Comparable in Total Risk to the Utility Proxy Group | DWD-6 |
| Cost of Common Equity Models Applied to the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group | DWD-7 |
| Estimated Market Capitalization for Southwestern Electric Power Company and the Utility Proxy Group | DWD-8 |

Southwestern Electric Power Company Recommended Capital Structure and Cost Rates for Ratemaking Purposes

| Type Of Capital | Ratios (1) | Cost Rate | Weighted Cost Rate |
|-----------------|------------|------------|-----------------------|
| Long-Term Debt | 50.63% | 4.18% (1) | 2.11% |
| Common Equity | 49.37% | 10.35% (2) | 5.11% |
| Total | 100.00% | , | 7.22% |

Notes:

- (1) Company-Provided
- (2) From page 2 of this Schedule.

Southwestern Electric Power Company **Brief Summary of Common Equity Cost Rate**

| | | Proxy Group of Fourteen Electric |
|----------|--|-------------------------------------|
| Line No. | Principal Methods | Companies |
| 1. | Discounted Cash Flow Model (DCF) (1) | 8.73% |
| 2. | Risk Premium Model (RPM) (2) | 10.54% |
| 3. | Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) (3) | 12.46% |
| 4. | Market Models Applied to Comparable Risk, Non-Price Regulated Companies (4) | 12.12% |
| 5. | Indicated Range of Common Equity Cost Rates before Adjustment for Company-Specific Risk | 9.85% - 10.96% |
| 6. | Size Risk Adjustment (5) | 0.20% |
| 7. | Credit Risk Adjustment (6) | 0.27% |
| 8. | Indicated Range of Common Equity Cost Rates after Adjustment | 10.32% - 11.43% |
| 9. | Recommended Common Equity Cost Rate | 10.35% |

- Notes: (1) From Schedule DWD-3.
 - (2) From page 1 of Schedule DWD-4.
 - (3) From page 1 of Schedule DWD-5.
 - (4) From page 1 of Schedule DWD-7.
 - (5) Adjustment to reflect the Company's greater business risk due to its smaller size realtive to the Utility Proxy Group as detailed in Mr. D'Ascendis' direct testimony.
 - (6) Company-specific risk adjustment to reflect SWEPCO's greater credit risk compared to the Utility Proxy Group. SWEPCO's Moody's bond rating of Baa2 is riskier than the Utility Proxy Group's Moody's bond rating of A3. An upward adjustment of 2/3 of the spread between A2 and Baa2 public utility bond yields (as shown on page 4 of Schedule DWD-4) is appropriate.

Southwestern Electric Power Company CAPITALIZATION AND FINANCIAL STATISTICS (1) 2015 - 2019, Inclusive

| | | • | | | | |
|--|--|-----------------------------------|---|-----------------------------------|---------------------------|---|
| | 2019 | 2018 (MILLI) | 2017 ONS OF DOLLARS) | 2016 | 2015 | |
| CAPITALIZATION STATISTICS | | (Missi | ons or Dobbins) | | | |
| AMOUNT OF CAPITAL EMPLOYED TOTAL PERMANENT CAPITAL SHORT-TERM DEBT TOTAL-CAPITAL EMPLOYED | \$ 5,000 942 \$ 59 860 \$ 5,060 802 \$ | | 4,605 707 \$ 118 680 4,724 387 \$ | 4,820 200 \$ - 4,820 200 \$ | 58 330 | |
| INDICATED AVERAGE CAPITAL COST RATES (2) TOTAL DEBT | 411 % | 451 % | 449 % | 491 % | 5 49 % | |
| CAPITAL STRUCTURE RATIOS BASED ON TOTAL PERMANENT CAPITAL LONG-TERM DEBT PREFERRED STOCK COMMON EQUITY TOTAL | 51 20 % - 48 80 100 00 % | 53 03 % - 46 97 100 00 % | 51 48 % - 48 52 100 00 % | 54 05 % - 45 95 100 00 % | 50 41 % 5 - 49 59 4 | PEAR PRAGE 2 03 % -7 97 00 00 % |
| BASED ON TOTAL CAPITAL TOTAL DEBT, INCLUDING SHORT-TERM PREFERRED STOCK COMMON EQUITY TOTAL | 5178 % - 4822 100 00 % | 53 03 % - 46 97 100 00 % | 52 70 % -47 30 100 00 % | 54 05 % -45 95 100 00 % | 48 93 4 | 2 53 % - 7 47 0 00 % |
| DIVIDEND PAYOUT RATIO | 23 64 % | 44 15 % | 88 22 % | 72 48 % | 6239 % 5 | 818 % |
| RATE OF RETURN ON AVERAGE BOOK COMMON EQUITY | 6 67 % | 6 47 % | 560 % | 755 % | 902 % | 706 % |
| TOTAL DEBT / EBITDA (3) | 509 x | 498 x | 483 x | 496 x | 3 92 x | 476 x |
| FUNDS FROM OPERATIONS / TOTAL DEBT (4) | 11 49 % | 19 40 % | 1785 % | 1201 % | 1716 % 1 | 5 58 % |
| TOTAL DEBT / TOTAL CAPITAL | 51 78 % | 53 03 % | 52 70 % | 54 05 % | 5107 % 5 | 253 % |

Notes

- (1) All capitalization and financial statistics for the group are the arithmetic average of the achieved results for each individual

 (2) Computed by relating actual total debt interest or preferred stock dividends booked to average of beginning and ending total

 (3) Total debt relative to EBITDA (Earnings before Interest, Income Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization)

 (4) Funds from operations (sum of net income, depreciation, amortization, net deferred income tax and investment tax credits, less

Source of Information Company audited financial statements

Proxy Group of Fourteen Electric Companies CAPITALIZATION AND FINANCIAL STATISTICS (1) 2015 - 2019, Inclusive

| CAPITALIZATION STATISTICS | 2019 | 2018 (MIL | 2017 LIONS OF DOLLARS) | 2016 | 2015 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|--------------------------------------|
| AMOUNT OF CAPITAL EMPLOYED TOTAL PERMANENT CAPITAL SHORT-TERM DEBT TOTAL CAPITAL EMPLOYED | \$19,269 964 \$530 136 \$19,800 100 | \$17,567.886 \$605.674 \$18,173.560 | \$16,616 842 \$625 260 \$17,242 102 | \$15,844 640 \$462 079 \$16,306 719 | \$14,799 184 \$479 850 \$15,279.034 | |
| INDICATED AVERAGE CAPITAL COST RATES (2) TOTAL DEBT PREFERRED STOCK CAPITAL STRUCTURE RATIOS | 4 43 % 5.44 | 4 63 % 5 22 | 5 4 63 % 5 28 | 4 85 % 5.42 | 5 4 65 % 5.39 | 5 YEAR AVERAGE |
| BASED ON TOTAL PERMANENT CAPITAL: LONG-TERM DEBT PREFERRED STOCK COMMON EQUITY TOTAL | 52 11 % 0.72 47 17 100 00 % | 51.53 % 0.85 47 62 100 00 % | 0 90 48 70 | 50.28 % 0 94 48 78 100 00 % | 0.96 49 35 | 50 80 % 0 87 48 33 100 00 % |
| BASED ON TOTAL CAPITAL TOTAL DEBT, INCLUDING SHORT-TERM PREFERRED STOCK COMMON EQUITY TOTAL | 52 86 % 0.70 46 44 100 00 % | 52 49 % 0 83 46 68 100 00 % | 0 84 46.91 | 51 75 % 0 90 47.36 100.00 % | 0 94 48 08 | 52 07 % 0 84 47 09 100 00 % |
| FINANCIAL STATISTICS | | | | | | |
| FINANCIAL RATIOS - MARKET BASED EARNINGS / PRICE RATIO MARKET / AVERAGE BOOK RATIO DIVIDEND YIELD DIVIDEND PAYOUT RATIO | 4 86 % 206 49 3 14 66 12 | 4 94 % 197.18 3 46 48 51 | 4 60 % 204 94 3 23 76 76 | 4 58 % 167.90 3 49 53 36 | 4 70 % 161.63 3 61 59 95 | 4 73 % 187.63 3 39 60.94 |
| RATE OF RETURN ON AVERAGE BOOK COMMON EQUITY | 985 % | 8.58 % | 8.82 % | 797 % | 7.77 % | 860 % |
| TOTAL DEBT / EBITDA (3) | 4.50 x | 497 x | 403 x | 5.27 x | 433 x | 462 x |
| FUNDS FROM OPERATIONS / TOTAL DEBT (4) | 15 07 % | 20 23 % | 19.99 % | 18 97 % | 23 09 % | 1947 % |
| TOTAL DEBT / TOTAL CAPITAL | 52 86 % | 52 49 % | 52 25 % | 51 75 % | 50 98 % | 52 07 % |

Notes.

- (1) All capitalization and financial statistics for the group are the arithmetic average of the achieved results for each individual company in the group, and are based upon financial statements as originally reported in each year.
- (2) Computed by relating actual total debt interest or preferred stock dividends booked to average of beginning and ending total debt or preferred stock reported to be outstanding
- (3) Total debt relative to EBITDA (Earnings before Interest, Income Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization)
- (4) Funds from operations (sum of net income, depreciation, amortization, net deferred income tax and investment tax credits, less total AFUDC) plus interest charges as a percentage of total debt.

Source of Information Company Annual Forms 10-K

Capital Structure Based upon Total Permanent Capital for the Proxy Group of Fourteen Electric Companies 2015 - 2019, Inclusive

| | <u>2019</u> | 2018 | 2017 | <u>2016</u> | 2015 | <u>5 YEAR</u> AVERAGE |
|-----------------------------------|-------------|-----------|----------|-------------|----------|--------------------------|
| ALLETE | | | | | | |
| Long-Term Debt | 41.96 % | 40.80 % | 42.09 % | 45.15 % | 46.86 % | 43.37 % |
| Preferred Stock | - | _ | - | - | - | 0.00 |
| Common Equity | 58.04 | 59 20 | 57 91 | 54 85 | 53.14 | 56.63 |
| Total Capital | 100.00 % | 100 00 % | 100.00 % | 100.00 % | 100.00 % | 100.00 % |
| Alliant Energy | | | | | | |
| Long-Term Debt | 53.39 % | 53.49 % | 52.62 % | 50 34 % | 49.43 % | 51.85 % |
| Preferred Stock | 1.72 | 1 94 | 2 16 | 2 33 | 2.58 | 2 1 5 |
| Common Equity | 44 89 | 44.57 | 45.22 | 47.33 | 47.99 | 46.00 |
| Total Capital | 100.00 % | 100 00 % | 100.00 % | 100.00 % | 100.00 % | 100.00 % |
| Ameren Corp. | | | | | | |
| Long-Term Debt | 53.29 % | | 51 52 % | 50 11 % | 50 65 % | 51 52 % |
| Preferred Stock | 0.81 | 0.88 | 0.92 | 0.98 | 0.99 | 0.92 |
| Common Equity | 45.90 | 47.07 | 47 56 | 48.91 | 48.36 | 47.56 |
| Total Capital | 100.00 % | 100.00 % | 100.00 % | 100.00 % | 100 00 % | 100 00 % |
| | | | | | | |
| Duke Energy | | | | | | |
| Long-Term Debt | 5539 % | 55.45 % | 55.61 % | 53.85 % | 49 87 % | 54 03 % |
| Preferred Stock | - | - | - | - | - | 0.00 |
| Common Equity | 44.61_ | 44.55 | 44.39 | 46.15 | 50.13 | 45.97 |
| Total Capital | 100.00 % | 100.00 % | 100.00 % | 100 00 % | 100 00 % | 100 00 % |
| Edison Int'l | | | | | | |
| Long-Term Debt | 54 21 % | 53.76 % | 46.65 % | 44.02 % | 45.68 % | 48.86 % |
| Preferred Stock | 6 48 | 8.02 | 8.44 | 8 65 | 8 20 | 7.96 |
| Common Equity | 39.31 | 38.22 | 44.91 | 47 33 | 46.12 | 43.18 |
| Total Capital | 100.00 % | 100 00 % | 100.00 % | 100.00 % | 100.00 % | 100.00 % |
| Entergy Corp. | | | | | | |
| Long-Term Debt | 63.12 % | | 6480 % | 64.16 % | 58 19 % | 62.87 % |
| Preferred Stock | 0 78 | 0.87 | 0.85 | 0.88 | 1 39 | 0 95 |
| Common Equity | 36.10 | 35 05 | 34 35 | 34.96 | 40.42 | 36.18 |
| Total Capital | 100.00 % | 100 00 % | 100.00 % | 100.00 % | 100.00 % | 100.00 % |
| IDACORD Inc. | | | | | | |
| IDACORP, Inc. | 42.70 % | 43 63 % | 43 68 % | 44.77 % | 45 62 % | 44.08 % |
| Long-Term Debt Preferred Stock | 42.70 % | 43 63 % | 43 00 % | 44.77 90 | 43 02 % | 0 00 |
| Common Equity | 57 30 | 5637 | 56.32 | 55.23 | 54.38 | 55.92 |
| Total Capital | 100 00 % | | 100.00 % | 100.00 % | 100 00 % | 100.00 % |
| Total Capital | 10000 70 | 100.00 /0 | 100.00 | 100.00 /0 | 70 | 100.00 70 |
| NorthWestern Corp. | | | | | | |
| Long-Term Debt | 52.27 % | 51 98 % | 50.26 % | 52 05 % | 53.08 % | 51.93 % |
| Preferred Stock | - | - | - | - | - | 0.00 |
| Common Equity | 47.73 | 48.02 | 49.74 | 47.95 | 46 92 | 48.07 |
| Total Capital | 100 00 % | 100.00 % | 100 00 % | 100 00 % | 100 00 % | 100 00 % |

<u>Capital Structure Based upon Total Permanent Capital for the Proxy Group of Fourteen Electric Companies</u> <u>2015 - 2019, Inclusive</u>

| | <u>2019</u> | | <u>2018</u> | | <u>2017</u> | | 2016 | | 2015 | | <u>5 YEAR</u> <u>AVERAGE</u> |
|--|-------------|-------|-------------|--------|-------------|-------|--------|--------|--------|------|---------------------------------|
| OGE Energy | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Long-Term Debt | 43 56 | % | 44.00 | % | 43.78 | % | 43 31 | % | 45 31 | % | 43.99 % |
| Preferred Stock | - | | - | | - | | - | | - | | 0.00 |
| Common Equity | 56.44 | | 56 00 | _ | 56.22 | _ | 56 69 | _ | 54.69 | | 56.01 |
| Total Capital | 100.00 | % | 100 00 | % = | 100.00 | _% | 100.00 | - % | 100.00 | % | 100.00 % |
| Otter Tail Corp | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Long-Term Debt | 46 88 | % | 44.74 | % | 41 31 | % | 44.56 | % | 45.17 | % | 44.53 % |
| Preferred Stock | - | | - | | - | | - | | - | | 0.00 |
| Common Equity | 53.12 | | 55.26 | | 58 69 | | 55.44 | | 54.83 | | 55.47 |
| Total Capital | 100 00 | % | 100.00 | % [| 100 00 | _% | 100.00 | _% | 100.00 | % | 100.00 % |
| | | | | • | | - | | - | | - | |
| Pinnacle West Capital | #0.04 | • | 40.50 | | 10.60 | 0.1 | 44.00 | | 45.45 | ٠, | 10.10.01 |
| Long-Term Debt | 50.91 | % | 49 59 | % | 48.68 | % | 46.33 | % | 45.45 | % | 48.19 % |
| Preferred Stock | | | - | | - | | - | | - | | 0.00 |
| Common Equity | 49.09 | ٠ | 50.41 | | 51.32 | - , , | 53 67 | | 54.55 | - , | 51.81 |
| Total Capital | 100 00 | .% | 100 00 | % . | 100.00 | - % | 100.00 | = % | 100.00 | - % | % |
| PNM Resources | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Long-Term Debt | 64.02 | % | 61.10 | % | 57.89 | % | 58 64 | % | 55.66 | % | 59.46 % |
| Preferred Stock | 0.25 | , , | 0.26 | | 0 28 | | 0.28 | | 0 31 | | 0 28 |
| Common Equity | 35 73 | | 38 64 | | 41.83 | | 41.08 | | 44.03 | | 40.26 |
| Total Capital | 100.00 | % | 100.00 | % - | 100 00 | - % | 100 00 | - % | 100 00 | % | 100.00 % |
| • | | ' ' | | - | | = | | = | | • | |
| Portland General | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Long-Term Debt | 50 06 | % | 49.72 | % | 50 10 | % | 50.06 | % | 49.39 | % | 49.87 % |
| Preferred Stock | - | | - | | - | | • | | - | | 0.00 |
| Common Equity | 49.94 | | 50 28 | - | 49.90 | _ | 49.94 | _ | 50.61 | _ | 50.13 |
| Total Capital | 100 00 | .% | 100.00 | % _ | 100.00 | - % | 100.00 | _ % | 100.00 | % | 100.00 % |
| Xcel Energy Inc | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Long-Term Debt | 57.77 | % | 57.01 | % | 56.66 | % | 56.73 | % | 55.36 | % | 56.71 % |
| Preferred Stock | - | /0 | - | 70 | - | ,, | - | 70 | - | ,, | 0 0 0 |
| Common Equity | 42 23 | | 42.99 | | 43 34 | | 43.27 | | 44.64 | | 43.29 |
| Total Capital | 100.00 | % | | % - | | - % | 100.00 | % | | % | 100.00 % |
| | | | | - | | = | | = | | • | |
| Proxy Group of Fourteen Electric Companies | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Long-Term Debt | 52.11 | % | 51.52 | % | 50.41 | % | 50.29 | % | 49.70 | % | 50.80 % |
| Preferred Stock | 0.72 | /0 | 0.86 | 70 | 0 90 | 70 | 0.94 | 70 | 0 96 | /0 | 0.88 |
| Common Equity | 47 17 | | 47.62 | | 48.69 | | 48.77 | | 49.34 | | 48.32 |
| Total Capital | 100.00 | % | 100.00 | · % | 100.00 | - % | | -% | 100.00 | % | 100.00 % |
| roun capital | 100.00 | , , o | 100.00 | ′° = | 100.00 | = ′′ | 100.00 | = '0 | 100.00 | • ′0 | 100.00 /0 |

Source of Information Annual Forms 10-K

Southwestern Eletric Power Company Operating Subsidiary Company Capital Structures of the Proxy Group of Sixteen Electric Companies

2019

| | Parent | | | |
|---|---------|--------|-----------|---------|
| | Company | Common | Long-Term | Total |
| Company Name | Ticker | Equity | Debt | Capital |
| ALLETE (Minnesota Power) | ALE | 59.59% | 40.41% | 100.00% |
| Superior Water, Light and Power Company | ALE | 58.08% | 41 92% | 100.00% |
| Interstate Power and Light Company | LNT | 50.23% | 49.77% | 100 00% |
| Wisconsin Power and Light Company | LNT | 53.78% | 46.22% | 100.00% |
| Ameren Illinois Company | AEE | 53.00% | 47 00% | 100.00% |
| Union Electric Company | AEE | 51.90% | 48.10% | 100.00% |
| Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC | DUK | 52.11% | 47.89% | 100.00% |
| Duke Energy Florida, LLC | DUK | 49.91% | 50 09% | 100.00% |
| Duke Energy Indiana, LLC | DUK | 52 84% | 47.16% | 100.00% |
| Duke Energy Kentucky, Inc. | DUK | 49.37% | 50.63% | 100.00% |
| Duke Energy Ohio, Inc. | DUK | 65.22% | 34 78% | 100.00% |
| Duke Energy Progress, LLC | DUK | 51.29% | 48.71% | 100.00% |
| Southern California Edison Company | EIX | 50.43% | 49.57% | 100 00% |
| Entergy Arkansas, LLC | ETR | 47.90% | 52.10% | 100.00% |
| Entergy Louisiana, LLC | ETR | 47.47% | 52.53% | 100.00% |
| Entergy Mississippi, LLC | ETR | 48 60% | 51.40% | 100.00% |
| Entergy New Orleans, LLC | ETR | 49.26% | 50.74% | 100.00% |
| Entergy Texas, Inc. | ETR | 50.43% | 49.57% | 100.00% |
| Idaho Power Company | IDA | 55 14% | 44.86% | 100.00% |
| NorthWestern Corporation | NWE | 47.59% | 52 41% | 100.00% |
| Oklahoma Gas and Electric Company | OGE | 55.15% | 44.85% | 100.00% |
| Otter Tail Power Company | OTTR | 51.12% | 48.88% | 100.00% |
| Public Service Company of New Mexico | PNM | 45.23% | 54.77% | 100.00% |
| Texas-New Mexico Power Company | PNM | 52.74% | 47.26% | 100.00% |
| Arızona Public Service Company | PNW | 52 80% | 47.20% | 100.00% |
| Portland General Electric Company | POR | 49 85% | 50.15% | 100.00% |
| Northern States Power Company - MN | XEL | 52.20% | 47.80% | 100.00% |
| Northern States Power Company - WI | XEL | 54 23% | 45.77% | 100.00% |
| Public Service Company of Colorado | XEL | 56.32% | 43.68% | 100.00% |
| Southwestern Public Service Company | XEL | 54.14% | 45.86% | 100.00% |
| | Mean | 52 26% | 47.74% | 100.00% |
| | Median | 52.00% | 48.00%_ | 100.00% |
| | | | | |

Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence

<u>Southwestern Flectric Power Company</u> Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate Using the Discounted Cash Flow Model for the <u>Proxy Group of Fourteen Electric Companies</u>

| | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] | [5] | [6] | [7] | [8] |
|---|----------------------------------|---|--|--|--|---|-----------------------------------|--|
| Proxy Group of Fourteen Electric Companies | Average Dividend Yield (1) | Value Line Projected Five Year Growth in EPS (2) | Zack's Five Year Projected Growth Rate in EPS | Bloomberg's Five Year Projected Growth Rate in EPS | Yahoo ¹ Finance Projected Five Year Growth in EPS | Average Projected Tive Year Growth in EPS (3) | Adjusted Dividend Yield (4) | Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate (5) |
| ALLETE | 434 % | 550 % | NA % | 640 % | 7 00 % | 630 % | 4 48 % | 1078 % |
| Alliant Energy | 3 09 | 650 | 5 50 | 5 46 | 5 30 | 5 69 | 3 18 | 8 87 |
| Ameren Corp | 2 69 | 6 00 | 680 | 7 03 | 5 85 | 6 42 | 2 78 | 9 2 0 |
| Duke Energy | 4 62 | 5 00 | 4 30 | 4 02 | 3 81 | 4 28 | 4 72 | 9 00 |
| Edison Int'l | 4 49 | NMΓ | 3 30 | 4 2 6 | 1 40 | 2 99 | 4 5 6 | 7 55 |
| Fntergy Corp | 3 78 | 3 00 | 5 70 | 5 06 | 5 95 | 4 93 | 3 87 | 8 80 |
| IDACORP, Inc | 2 98 | 3 50 | 2 60 | 3 00 | 2 60 | 2 93 | 3 02 | 5 95 |
| NorthWestern Corp | 4 2 7 | 150 | 3 40 | 3 80 | 3 71 | 3 10 | 4 34 | 7 44 |
| OGE Energy | 4 94 | 3 00 | 3 70 | 3 59 | 2 40 | 3 17 | 5 02 | 8 19 |
| Otter Tail Corp | 3 71 | 3 5 0 | NA | NA | 9 00 | 6 25 | 3 83 | 10 08 |
| Pinnacle West Capital | 4 08 | 4 00 | 4 70 | 478 | 4 36 | 4 46 | 4 17 | 8 63 |
| PNM Resources | 3 11 | 6 00 | 6 20 | 576 | 5 60 | 5 89 | 3 20 | 9 09 |
| Portland General | 3 73 | 4 00 | 5 30 | 4 72 | 4 45 | 4 62 | 3 82 | 8 44 |
| Xcel Energy Inc | 2 69 | 6 00 | 610 | 6 04 | 6 10 | 6 06 | 2 77 | 8 83 |
| | | | | | | | Average | 8 63 % |
| | | | | | | | Median | 8 82 % |
| | | | | | | Average of M | ean and Median | 8 73 % |

NA= Not Available NMF= Not Meaningful Figure

Notes


- (1) Indicated dividend at 07/31/2020 divided by the average closing price of the last 60 trading days ending 07/31/2020 for each company
- (2) From pages 2 through 15 of this Schedule
- (3) Average of columns 2 through 15 of this Schedule


 (3) Average of columns 2 through 5 excluding negative growth rates


 (4) This reflects a growth rate component equal to one-half the conclusion of growth rate (from column 6) x column 1 to reflect the periodic payment of dividends (Gordon Model) as opposed to the continuous payment. Thus, for ALLETE, 4 34% x (1+(1/2 x 6 30%)) = 4 48%
- (5) Column 6 + column 7


Source of Information


Value Line Investment Survey www zacks com Downloaded on 07/31/2020 www yahoo com Downloaded on 07/31/2020 Bloomberg Professional Services






































Southwestern Electric Power Company Summary of Risk Premium Models for the Proxy Group of Fourteen Electric Companies

| | | Proxy Group of Fourteen Electric Companies |
|--|---------|--|
| Predictive Risk Premium Model (PRPM) (1) | | 10.27 % |
| Risk Premium Using an Adjusted Total Market Approach (2) | | 10.80 % |
| | Average | 10.54 % |

Notes:

- (1) From page 2 of this Schedule.
- (2) From page 3 of this Schedule.

Southwestern Electric Power Company Indicated ROE Derived by the Predictive Risk Premium Model (1).

| | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] | [5] | [6] | [7] |
|---|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|
| Proxy Group of Fourteen Electric Companies | LT Average Predicted Variance | Spot Predicted Variance | Recommended Variance (2) | GARCH Coefficient | Predicted Risk Premium (3) | Risk-Free Rate (4) | Indicated ROE (5) |
| ALLETE | 0 28% | 0.46% | 0 28% | 2 1192 | 7 48% | 2 09% | 9 57% |
| Alliant Energy | 0 27% | 0 30% | 0 27% | 2 6418 | 8 82% | 2 09% | 10 91% |
| Ameren Corp. | 0 23% | 0 22% | 0 23% | 1.9633 | 5 53% | 2 09% | 7.62% |
| Duke Energy | 0 31% | 0.36% | 0.31% | 1.7551 | 6.78% | 2 09% | 8 87% |
| Edison Int'l | 0 43% | 0 84% | 0.43% | 1.4702 | 7 90% | 2 09% | 9.99% |
| Entergy Corp. | 0 40% | 0 72% | 0 40% | 2.2346 | 11 29% | 2.09% | 13 38% |
| IDACORP, Inc | 0 28% | 0 36% | 0 28% | 2 1772 | 7 69% | 2 09% | 9 78% |
| NorthWestern Corp. | 0.34% | 0 64% | 0 34% | 2.4412 | 10 29% | 2 09% | 12 38% |
| OGE Energy | 0 31% | 0.55% | 0.31% | 2,1622 | 8 33% | 2 09% | 10 42% |
| Otter Tail Corp. | 0 37% | 0 49% | 0 37% | 1 5713 | 7 28% | 2.09% | 9 37% |
| Pinnacle West Capital | 0.60% | 0 51% | 0 60% | 1 2494 | 9 38% | 2 09% | 11 47% |
| PNM Resources | 0 53% | 071% | 0.53% | 1.2825 | 8 48% | 2 09% | 10 57% |
| Portland General | 0 26% | 0.59% | 0 26% | 2 0274 | 6 48% | 2.09% | 8 57% |
| Xcel Energy Inc. | 0 27% | 0 26% | 0.27% | 2.8017 | 9 64% | 2.09% | 11.73% |
| | | | | | | Average | 10.33% |
| | | | | | | Median | 10.21% |
| | | | | | Average of Mea | n and Median | 10.27% |

Notes

- (1) The Predictive Risk Premium Model uses historical data to generate a predicted variance and a GARCH coefficient. The historical data used are the equity risk premiums for the first available trading month as reported by Bloomberg Professional Service
- (2) Given current market conditions, I recommend using the long-term average predicted variance.
- (3) (1+(Column [3] * Column [4])⁻¹²) 1 (4) From note 2 on page 2 of Schedule DWD-5 (5) Column [5] + Column [6].

Southwestern Electric Power Company Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate Through Use of a Risk Premium Model Using an Adjusted Total Market Approach

| Line No. | | | Proxy Group of Fourteen Electric Companies | | | |
|----------|-----|--|--|--|--|--|
| 1. | | Prospective Yield on Aaa Rated Corporate Bonds (1) | 3.03 % | | | |
| 2. | | Adjustment to Reflect Yield Spread Between Aaa Rated Corporate Bonds and A Rated Public Utility Bonds | 0.61 (2) | | | |
| 3. | | Adjusted Prospective Yield on A Rated Public Utility Bonds | 3.64 % | | | |
| 4. | | Adjustment to Reflect Bond Rating Difference of Proxy Group | 0.14 (3) | | | |
| 5. | | Adjusted Prospective Bond Yield | 3.78 % | | | |
| 6. | | Equity Risk Premium (4) | 7.02 | | | |
| 7. | | Risk Premium Derived Common Equity Cost Rate | 10.80 % | | | |
| Notes: | (1) | Consensus forecast of Moody's Aaa Rated Corpora Chip Financial Forecasts (see pages 10-11 of this | | | | |
| | (2) | The average yield spread of A rated public utility bonds over Aaa rated corporate bonds of 0.61% from page 4 of this Schedule. | | | | |
| | (3) | Adjustment to reflect the A3 Moody's LT issuer ra | iting of the Utility | | | |

Proxy Group as shown on page 5 of this Schedule. The 0.14% upward adjustment is derived by taking 1/3 of the spread between A2 and Baa2 Public Utility Bonds (1/3*0.41% = 0.14%) as derived from

page 4 of this Schedule.(4) From page 7 of this Schedule.

Southwestern Electric Power Company Interest Rates and Bond Spreads for Moody's Corporate and Public Utility Bonds

Selected Bond Yields

[1] [2] [3]

| | Aaa Rated Corporate Bond | A Rated Public Utility Bond | Baa Rated Public Utility Bond |
|----------|-----------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| Jul-2020 | 2.03 % | 2.56 % | 2.93 % |
| Jun-2020 | 2.41 | 3.07 | 3.44 |
| May-2020 | 2.49 | 3.14 | 3.63 |
| Average | 2.31 % | 2.92_% | 3.33 % |

Selected Bond Spreads

A Rated Public Utility Bonds Over Aaa Rated Corporate Bonds:

0.61 % (1)

Baa Rated Public Utility Bonds Over A Rated Public Utility Bonds:

0.41 % (2)

Notes:

- (1) Column [2] Column [1].
- (2) Column [3] Column [2].

Source of Information:

Bloomberg Professional Service

Southwestern Electric Power Company Comparison of Long-Term Issuer Ratings for Proxy Group of Fourteen Electric Companies

| Moody's | Standard & Poor's | | |
|-------------------------|-------------------------|--|--|
| Long-Term Issuer Rating | Long-Term Issuer Rating | | |
| July 2020 | July 2020 | | |

| Proxy Group of Fourteen Electric Companies | Long-Term Issuer Rating (1) | Numerical Weighting (2) | Long-Term Issuer Rating (1) | Numerical Weighting (2) |
|--|-----------------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------------|
| ALLETE | А3 | 7.0 | NR | |
| Alliant Energy | A3/Baa1 | 7.5 | A/A- | 6.5 |
| Ameren Corp. | A3 | 7.0 | BBB+ | 8.0 |
| Duke Energy | A3 | 7.0 | A- | 7.0 |
| Edison Int'l | Baa2 | 9.0 | BBB | 9.0 |
| Entergy Corp. | Baa1/Baa2 | 8.5 | A- | 7.0 |
| IDACORP, Inc. | A3 | 7.0 | BBB | 9.0 |
| NorthWestern Corp. | NR | | NR | |
| OGE Energy | А3 | 7.0 | A- | 7.0 |
| Otter Tail Corp. | A3 | 7.0 | BBB+ | 8.0 |
| Pinnacle West Capital | A2 | 6.0 | A- | 7.0 |
| PNM Resources | Baa1 | 8.0 | BBB+/BBB | 8.5 |
| Portland General | А3 | 7.0 | BBB+ | 8.0 |
| Xcel Energy Inc. | A3 | 7.0 | A- | 7.0 |
| Average | A3 | 7.3 | BBB+ | 7.7 |

Notes:

- (1) Ratings are that of the average of each company's utility operating subsidiaries.
- (2) From page 6 of this Schedule.

Source Information:

Moody's Investors Service

Standard & Poor's Global Utilities Rating Service

Numerical Assignment for Moody's and Standard & Poor's Bond Ratings

| Moody's Bond Rating | Numerical Bond Weighting | Standard & Poor's Bond Rating |
|------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------------------|
| Aaa | 1 | AAA |
| Aa1 | 2 | AA+ |
| Aa2 | 3 | AA |
| Aa3 | 4 | AA- |
| A1 | 5 | A+ |
| A2 | 6 | A |
| A3 | 7 | A- |
| Baa1 | 8 | BBB+ |
| Baa2 | 9 | BBB |
| Baa3 | 10 | ввв- |
| Ba1 | 11 | BB+ |
| Ba2 | 12 | BB |
| Ba3 | 13 | BB- |
| B1 | 14 | B+ |
| B2 | 15 | В+ |
| | | В- |
| В3 | 16 | D- |

Southwestern Electric Power Company Judgment of Equity Risk Premium for Proxy Group of Fourteen Electric Companies

| Line No. | | Proxy Group of Fourteen Electric Companies |
|-------------|---|--|
| | | |
| 1. | Calculated equity risk premium based on the total market using the beta approach (1) | 9.42 % |
| 2. | Mean equity risk premium based on a study using the holding period returns of public utilities with A rated bonds (2) | 5.77 |
| 3. | Predicted Equity Risk Premium Based on Regression Analysis of 1,167 Fully-Litigated Electric Utility Rate Cases | 5.88 |
| 4. | Average equity risk premium | 7.02 % |
| Notes: | From page 8 of this Schedule. From page 12 of this Schedule. From page 13 of this Schedule. | |

Southwestern Electric Power Company Derivation of Equity Risk Premium Based on the Total Market Approach Using the Beta for the Proxy Group of Fourteen Electric Companies

| Line No. | Equity Risk Premium Measure | Proxy Group of Fourteen Electric Companies |
|----------|--|--|
| | Ibbotson-Based Equity Risk Premiums: | |
| 1. | Ibbotson Equity Risk Premium (1) | 5.78 % |
| 2. | Regression on Ibbotson Risk Premium Data (2) | 9.34 |
| 3. | Ibbotson Equity Risk Premium based on PRPM (3) | 9.55 |
| 4. | Equity Risk Premium Based on Value Line Summary and Index (4) | 13.50 |
| 5. | Equity Risk Premium Based on Value Line S&P 500 Companies (5) | 10.63 |
| 6. | Equity Risk Premium Based on Bloomberg S&P 500 Companies (6) | 10.72 |
| 7. | Conclusion of Equity Risk Premium | 9.92 % |
| 8. | Adjusted Beta (7) | 0.95 |
| 9. | Forecasted Equity Risk Premium | 9.42 % |

Notes provided on page 9 of this Schedule.

Southwestern Electric Power Company Derivation of Equity Risk Premium Based on the Total Market Approach Using the Beta for the

Proxy Group of Fourteen Electric Companies

Notes:

- (1) Based on the arithmetic mean historical monthly returns on large company common stocks from Ibbotson® SBBI® 2020 Market Report minus the arithmetic mean monthly yield of Moody's average Aaa and Aa corporate bonds from 1926-2019.
- (2) This equity risk premium is based on a regression of the monthly equity risk premiums of large company common stocks relative to Moody's average Aaa and Aa rated corporate bond yields from 1928-2019 referenced in Note 1 above.
- (3) The Predictive Risk Premium Model (PRPM) is discussed in the accompanying direct testimony. The Ibbotson equity risk premium based on the PRPM is derived by applying the PRPM to the monthly risk premiums between Ibbotson large company common stock monthly returns and average Aaa and Aa corporate monthly bond yields, from January 1928 through July 2020.
- (4) The equity risk premium based on the Value Line Summary and Index is derived by subtracting the average consensus forecast of Aaa corporate bonds of 3.03% (from page 3 of this Schedule) from the projected 3-5 year total annual market return of 16.53% (described fully in note 1 on page 2 of Schedule DWD-5).
- (5) Using data from Value Line for the S&P 500, an expected total return of 13.66% was derived based upon expected dividend yields and long-term earnings growth estimates as a proxy for capital appreciation. Subtracting the average consensus forecast of Aaa corporate bonds of 3.03% results in an expected equity risk premium of 10.63%.
- (6) Using data from the Bloomberg Professional Service for the S&P 500, an expected total return of 13.75% was derived based upon expected dividend yields and long-term earnings growth estimates as a proxy for capital appreciation. Subtracting the average consensus forecast of Aaa corporate bonds of 3.03% results in an expected equity risk premium of 10.72%.
- (7) Average of mean and median beta from page 1 of Schedule DWD-5.

Sources of Information:

Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation - 2020 SBBI Yearbook, John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Industrial Manual and Mergent Bond Record Monthly Update.


Value Line Summary and Index
Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, June 1, 2020 and July 31, 2020

Bloomberg Professional Service

Consensus Forecasts of U.S. Interest Rates and Key Assumptions

| | History | | | | | | | Consensus Forecasts-Quarterly Avg. | | | | | | |
|------------------------|-------------------------|---------------|---------------|------------------------------|--------------|--------------|-------------------------------|------------------------------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| | Average For Week Ending | | | Average For Month Latest Qtr | | | | 3Q | 4Q | 1Q | 2Q | 3Q | 4Q | |
| Interest Rates | <u>Jul 24</u> | <u>Jul 17</u> | <u>Jul 10</u> | <u>Jul 3</u> | <u>Jun</u> | <u>May</u> | <u>Apr</u> | 2Q 2020 | 2020 | <u>2020</u> | <u> 2021</u> | 2021 | <u>2021</u> | <u>2021</u> |
| Federal Funds Rate | 0 09 | 0 09 | 0 09 | 0 08 | 0 08 | 0 05 | 0 05 | 0.06 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| Prime Rate | 3 25 | 3 25 | 3 25 | 3.25 | 3 25 | 3 25 | 3 25 | 3 25 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 3.3 |
| LIBOR, 3-mo | 0 25 | 0 27 | 0 27 | 0.30 | 031 | 0 40 | 1 09 | 0 60 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.5 |
| Commercial Paper, 1-mo | 0 12 | 0 12 | 0 12 | 0 11 | 0 12 | 0 13 | 0 47 | 0 24 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.3 |
| Treasury bill, 3-mo | 0.12 | 0 13 | 0 14 | 0.15 | 0.16 | 0 13 | 0.14 | 0 14 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 |
| Treasury bill, 6-mo. | 0 14 | 0 14 | 0 16 | 0.17 | 0.18 | 0 15 | 0.17 | 0 17 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 |
| Treasury bill, 1 yr | 0.15 | 0.15 | 0.15 | 0.16 | 0.18 | 0 16 | 0.18 | 0.17 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.4 |
| Treasury note, 2 yr | 0.15 | 0.15 | 0 16 | 0 16 | 0 19 | 0 17 | 0 22 | 0 19 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.5 |
| Treasury note, 5 yr | 0 27 | 0 29 | 0.30 | 0.29 | 0 34 | 0 34 | 0.39 | 0 36 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.8 |
| , Treasury note, 10 yr | 0 60 | 0.63 | 0 66 | 0.67 | 0 73 | 0.67 | 0 66 | 0 69 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| Treasury note, 30 yr | 1 28 | 1 32 | 1 37 | 1 42 | 1 49 | 1 38 | 1.27 | 1 38 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 1.9 |
| Corporate Aaa bond | 2 34 | 2 43 | 2 50 | 2 64 | 2 73 | 2 85 | 2 86 | 2 81 | 2.4 | 2.5 | 2.6 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 2.8 |
| Corporate Baa bond | 3 02 | 3 14 | 3 22 | 3 34 | 3 44 | 3 69 | 3 87 | 3 67 | 3.6 | 3.7 | 3.8 | 3.8 | 3.9 | 3.9 |
| State & Local bonds | 2 94 | 3 00 | 3.05 | 3.07 | 3 10 | 3.33 | 3 41 | 3.28 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.6 | 2.6 | 2.7 | 2.8 |
| Home mortgage rate | 3 01 | 2.98 | 3 03 | 3 07 | 3 16 | 3 23 | 3 31 | 3 23 | 3.1 | 3.1 | 3.1 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 3.3 |
| | | | | | | | Consensus Forecasts-Quarterly | | | | | | | |
| | 3Q | 4Q | 1Q | 2Q | 3Q | 4Q | 1Q | 2Q | 3Q | 4Q | 1Q | 2Q | 3Q | 4Q |
| Key Assumptions | <u>2018</u> | <u>2018</u> | <u> 2019</u> | <u> 2019</u> | <u> 2019</u> | <u> 2019</u> | <u>2020</u> | <u>2020</u> | <u>2020</u> | <u>2020</u> | <u>2021</u> | <u>2021</u> | 2021 | 2021 |
| Fed's AFE \$ Index | 107 8 | 109 4 | 109.4 | 1103 | 110 5 | 110.3 | 1112 | 112 4 | 109.7 | 109.7 | 109.7 | 109.5 | 109.3 | 109.1 |
| Real GDP | 2.1 | 1.3 | 29 | 15 | 2 6 | 2 4 | -5 0 | -32 9 | 18.4 | 6.7 | 5.8 | 4.7 | 4.0 | 3.4 |
| GDP Price Index | 18 | 18 | 12 | 2 5 | 1.5 | 1 4 | 1 4 | -18 | 1.5 | 1.3 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 1.7 |
| Consumer Price Index | 2 1 | 13 | 0 9 | 3 0 | 18 | 2 4 | 12 | -3 5 | 2.5 | 1.7 | 1.9 | 1.7 | 2.0 | 2.0 |

Forecasts for interest rates and the Federal Reserve's Major Currency Index represent averages for the quarter. Forecasts for Real GDP, GDP Price Index and Consumer Price Index are seasonally-adjusted annual rates of change (saar). Individual panel members' forecasts are on pages 4 through 9. Historical data. Treasury rates from the Federal Reserve Board's H 15, AAA-AA and A-BBB corporate bond yields from Bank of America-Merrill Lynch and are 15+ years, yield to maturity, State and local bond yields from Bank of America-Merrill Lynch, A-rated, yield to maturity, Mortgage rates from Freddie Mac, 30-year, fixed, LIBOR quotes from Intercontinental Exchange. All interest rate data are sourced from Haver Analytics. Historical data for Fed's Major Currency Index are from FRSR H 10. Historical data for Real GDP and GDP Channed Price Index are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Consumer Price Index (CPI) history is from the Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).



Long-Range Survey:

The table below contains the results of our twice-annual long-range CONSENSUS survey. There are also Top 10 and Bottom 10 averages for each variable. Shown are consensus estimates for the years 2021 through 2026 and averages for the five-year periods 2022-2026 and 2027-2031. Apply these projections cautiously. Few if any economic, demographic and political forces can be evaluated accurately over such long time spans.

| | | | Average For The Year | | | | | Five-Year Averages | | | | |
|-------------------------------|-------------------------------------|----------------|----------------------|------------------|--------------|----------|------------|--------------------|------------|--|--|--|
| | | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 | 2022-2026 | 2027-2031 | | | |
| I Federal Funds Rate | CONSENSUS | 0.2 | 0.4 | 1.0 | 1,6 | 1.9 | 2,1 | 1.4 | 2.3 | | | |
| | Top 10 Average | 0.4 | 0.8 | 16 | 2 2 | 2 5 | 2 7 | 19 | 28 | | | |
| | Bottom 10 Average | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.4 | 1.0 | 13 | 15 | 0.9 | 1 7 | | | |
| 2 Prime Rate | CONSENSUS | 3.4 | 3.6 | 4.1 | 4.7 | 5.0 | 5.2 | 4.5 | 5.4 | | | |
| | Top 10 Average | 3 5 | 3 9 | 4 6 | 5 3 | 5 5 | 5 7 | 5 0 | 59 | | | |
| | Bottom 10 Average | 3 3 | 3 3 | 3 7 | 4 2 | 4 5 | 4 7 | 4 1 | 4 9 | | | |
| 3 LIBOR, 3-Mo | CONSENSUS | 0.6 | 0.9 | 1.4 | 2.0 | 2.3 | 2.4 | 1.8 | 2.6 | | | |
| | Top 10 Average | 0.8 | 1 3 | 19 | 2 5 | 2 7 | 3 0 | 2 3 | 3 1 | | | |
| | Bottom 10 Average | 0 4 | 0.5 | 09 | 16 | 19 | 2 0 | 14 | 2 1 | | | |
| 4 Commercial Paper, 1-Mo | CONSENSUS | 0.6 | 0.9 | 1.4 | 2.0 | 2.2 | 2.3 | 1.7 | 2.6 | | | |
| | Top 10 Average | 0 7 | 12 | 1 8 | 2 3 | 2 6 | 2 8 | 2 1 | 3 0 | | | |
| | Bottom 10 Average | 0.3 | 0 5 | 1 1 | 16 | 19 | 2 0 | 1 4 | 2 2 | | | |
| 5 Treasury Bill Yield, 3-Mo | CONSENSUS | 0.2 | 0.5 | 1.1 | 1.6 | 1.9 | 2.1 | 1.4 | 2.3 | | | |
| | Top 10 Average | 0 4 | 09 | 1 6 | 2 2 | 2 4 | 2 6 | 19 | 2 8 | | | |
| | Bottom 10 Average | 0 1 | 0 2 | 0.5 | 1 1 | 14 | 16 | 09 | 18 | | | |
| 6 Treasury Bill Yield, 6-Mo | CONSENSUS | 0.3 | 0.6 | 1.1 | 1.7 | 2.0 | 2.2 | 1.5 | 2.5 | | | |
| | Top 10 Average | 0 4 | 09 | 1 7 | 2 3 | 26 | 2 7 | 2 0 | 3 0 | | | |
| | Bottom 10 Average | 0 2 | 0 2 | 0 6 | 1 2 | 1 5 | 1 7 | 1.1 | 19 | | | |
| 7 Treasury Bill Yield, I-Yr | CONSENSUS | 0.4 | 0.7 | 1.3 | 1.8 | 2.1 | 2.3 | 1.7 | 2.6 | | | |
| | Top 10 Average | 0.5 | 1 1 | 18 | 2 4 | 2 7 | 29 | 2 2 | 3 1 | | | |
| | Bottom 10 Average | 0 2 | 0.3 | 0.7 | 1 3 | 16 | 1 8 | 1 1 | 2 0 | | | |
| 8 Treasury Note Yield, 2-Yr | CONSENSUS | 0.5 | 0.9 | 1.5 | 2.0 | 2.3 | 2.5 | 1.8 | 2.7 | | | |
| | Top 10 Average | 0.8 | 1 3 | 2 0 | 2 5 | 29 | 3 0 | 2 4 | 3 3 | | | |
| | Bottom 10 Average | 0.3 | 0 4 | 09 | 1 4 | 1 7 | 2 0 | 13 | 2 2 | | | |
| 9 Treasury Note Yield, 5-Yr | CONSENSUS | 0.7 | 1.1 | 1.7 | 2.2 | 2.5 | 2.7 | 2.0 | 2.9 | | | |
| | Top 10 Average | 1 1 | 1 6 | 2 3 | 2 8 | 3 1 | 3 3 | 2 6 | 3 5 | | | |
| | Bottom 10 Average | 0 5 | 0 7 | 1 2 | 16 | 18 | 2 1 | 1 5 | 2 3 | | | |
| 10 Treasury Note Yield, 10-Yr | CONSENSUS | 1.2 | 1.5 | 2.1 | 2.5 | 2.7 | 2.9 | 2.3 | 3.1 | | | |
| | Top 10 Average | 1 5 | 2 0 | 26 | 3 1 | 3 3 | 3 5 | 29 | 3 8 | | | |
| | Bottom 10 Average | 0.8 | 1 1 | 16 | 19 | 2 1 | 2 2 | 18 | 2 5 | | | |
| 11 Treasury Bond Yield, 30-Yr | CONSENSUS | 1.8 | 2.2 | 2.7 | 3.1 | 3.3 | 3.5 | 3.0 | 3.8 | | | |
| | Top 10 Average | 2 2 | 2 7 | 3 3 | 3 7 | 3 9 | 4 1 | 3 5 | 4 4 | | | |
| | Bottom 10 Average | 1 4 | 1 7 | 2 2 | 2 6 | 2 8 | 2 9 | 2 4 | 3 1 | | | |
| 12 Corporate Aaa Bond Yield | CONSENSUS | 2.8 | 3.2 | 3.6 | 4.0 | 4.2 | 4.3 | 3.9 | 4.6 | | | |
| | Top 10 Average | 3 1 | 3 6 | 4 2 | 4 6 | 4 7 | 4 8 | 4 4 | 5 1 | | | |
| | Bottom 10 Average | 2 4 | 2 7 | 3 1 | 3 5 | 3 7 | 3 8 | 3 4 | 4 2 | | | |
| 13 Corporate Baa Bond Yield | CONSENSUS | 4.1 | 4.5 | 4.9 | 5.2 | 5.3 | 5.4 | 5.0 | 5.7 | | | |
| | Top 10 Average | 4 6 | 5 0 | 5 4 | 5 7 | 5 8 | 60 | 5 6 | 6 2 | | | |
| | Bottom 10 Average | 3 6 | 3 9 | 4 3 | 4 6 | 4 7 | 4 8 | 4 4 | 5 2 | | | |
| 14 State & Local Bonds Yield | CONSENSUS | 2.6 | 3.0 | 3.5 | 3.7 | 3.8 | 3.8 | 3.6 | 4.1 | | | |
| | Top 10 Average | 3 0 | 3 3 | 3 9 | 4 2 | 4 3 | 4 4 | 4 0 | 46 | | | |
| | Bottom 10 Average | 2 3 | 2 6 | 2 9 | 3 2 | 3 2 | 3 3 | 3 0 | 3 7 | | | |
| 15 Home Mortgage Rate | CONSENSUS | 3.4 | 3.6 | 4.0 | 4.4 | 4.5 | 4.7 | 4.2 | 4.9 | | | |
| | Top 10 Average | 3 8 | 4 0 | 4 5 | 4 8 | 5 0 | 5 2 | 4 7 | 5 5 | | | |
| | Bottom 10 Average | 3 0 | 3 2 | 3 5 | 3 9 | 4 1 | 4 1 | 3 7 | 4 4 | | | |
| A Fed's AFE Nominal \$ Index | CONSENSUS | 112.8 | 112.6 | 112.5 | 111.8 | 111.4 | 111.0 | 111.9 | 110.6 | | | |
| | Top 10 Average | 114 1 | 114 5 | 114 1 | 113 8 | 113 5 | 113 4 | 113 9 | 113 9 | | | |
| | Bottom 10 Average | 111 7 | 110 7 | 110 7 | 110 2 | 109 5 | 108 7 | 1100 | 107 6 | | | |
| | | | | | ar, % Change | | | Five-Year Averages | | | | |
| B Real GDP | CONCENCIO | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 | 2022-2026 | 2027-2031 | | | |
| P Veal ODE | CONSENSUS Top 10 Average | 3.2 5 7 | 3.2 4 3 | 2.4 29 | 2.2 | 2.1 | 2.0 | 2.4 2.9 | 2.1 | | | |
| | Top 10 Average Bottom 10 Average | 0.5 | 22 | | 2 5 | 23 18 | 23 | 19 | 24 | | | |
| C GDP Chained Price Index | CONSENSUS | 1.1 | 1.7 | 19 1.9 | 19 | 2.0 | 1 8 2.0 | 1.9 | 1 8 2.0 | | | |
| C GDI Chamed Files index | Top 10 Average | 1.1 | 2 2 | 2.2 | 2.0 2.2 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.2 | 2.0 | | | |
| | Bottom 10 Average | 03 | 13 | 16 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 17 | 19 | | | |
| D Consumer Price Index | CONSENSUS | 1.3 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.2 | | | |
| D Consumer rince maex | Top 10 Average | 2.2 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.2 | | | |
| | Bottom 10 Average | 04 | 15 | 18 | 18 | 19 | 19 | 18 | 2 4 | | | |
| | Dottom To Average | V 4 | 1.3 | 10 | 10 | 1 7 | 1 7 | 10 | 20 | | | |